Dyed-In-The-Wool History
The Trade War of the 1930’s
The trade war that developed in the 1930’s following the general economic collapse played a very large role in WWII and may have been the primary causal factor but it is generally overlooked today. To the extent that it is written about it is typically used as a cautionary tale to avoid the use of tariffs in the context of modern trade policies much the way the Munich Accord has been used over and over again to support neo-conservative foreign policies. Considering that the trade wars started off with gold backed currencies and devolved into a chaotic condition based on freely floating fiat currencies, the real cautionary tale here might have as much to do with fiat currency as it does the use of protective tariffs.
To understand what happened in the era before the war we need to go back to see what trade under the gold standard looked like prior to WWI.
The Gold System
From 1814 to 1914 the world was on a gold standard with the occasional use of silver meaning that the currency was a name for a certain amount of gold. The dollar was 1/20 of a gold ounce and the British pound slightly less than a quarter of an ounce. While the value of the respective currencies were not fixed in the sense that they were controlled by any government but in a practical sense they were fixed and gold acted as a sort of world currency. If a country or bank chose to expand their currency the market value of that currency against gold would simply decrease while inflation would hurt their exports until the currency rate adjusted. (1 pp. 89-92)
Economist and historian Murray Rothbard paraphrased David Hume explaining how gold acted as a natural constraint on government and banking writing:
“if one nation, say France, inflates its supply of paper francs, its prices rise; the increasing incomes in paper francs stimulate imports from abroad, which are also spurred by the fact that prices of imports are now relatively cheaper than prices at home. At the same time, the higher prices at home discourage exports abroad; the result is a deficit in the balance of payments, which must be paid for by foreign countries cashing in francs for gold. The gold outflow means that France must eventually contract its inflated paper francs in order to prevent a loss of all of its gold. If the inflation has taken the form of bank deposits, then the French banks have to contract their loans and deposits in order to avoid bankruptcy as foreigners call upon the French banks to redeem their deposits in gold. The contraction lowers prices at home, and generates an export surplus, thereby reversing the gold outflow, until the price levels are equalized in France and in other countries as well.” (1 pp. 90-1)
Classical trade theory was based around the gold standard. In the 19th century governments and private institutions leveraging government power tried consistently to intervene in the natural market mechanism but all they were ultimately able to do was slow the adjustments which still ultimately controlled the outcome. There were boom and bust cycles but the process was in the end self correcting. During WWI, however, the attempts to break the system and create an unbalanced playing field became more sophisticated and ultimately broke the natural controls.
During WWI the warring governments with the exception of the United States inflated their currencies to such an extent that they went off of the gold standard which was akin to declaring their bankruptcy. The US entered the war late and didn’t inflate its currency enough to endanger redeemability. Apart from the Americans, the other governments had freely fluctuating exchange rates leading to competitive devaluations, tariffs, and currency blocs creating general monetary chaos. There were few economists in this time period that would defend this situation and sought ways to restore order. (1 pp. 89-92)
The English “Gold Exchange” Scheme
After the war it would have seemed reasonable enough for the different victorious country’s currencies to simply return to the gold standard at a depreciated rate but that’s not what happened. In the case of Britain the pound would have been revalued at around $3.50 but instead of doing this the British imposed an artificial standard of $4.86 pound reflecting pre-war values (1 pp. 93-4). In order to do this they would have had to drastically deflate their money supply or their exports would become too expensive to be competitive resulting in mass unemployment. For the pound to return economic equilibrium, however, the British would have to roll back the rapid growth of their social welfare system and this was politically unacceptable. In fact the political trajectory in England was to continue to inflate money and prices (1 pp. 93-5). To do this they proposed a plan to create a “Gold Exchange” at the Genoa Conference in 1922. The plan was to have the United States remain on the gold standard redeeming dollars in gold while other countries would be on a pseudo gold standard where the currencies would not be payable in coins but in gold bars suitable for international transactions. This would prevent ordinary citizens from using gold and was intended to allow for more currency inflation without changing the exchange rate. Britain would redeem currency not entirely in gold but also in dollars and the other European countries would redeem currency in pounds creating artificial demand. Britain would then attempt to compel the other countries to return gold at the overvalued rate while also encouraging other governments to run deficits. (1 pp. 93-6)
When Britain inflated their money supply or ran a trade imbalance the market could no longer work quickly to act as a constraint as the pounds were generally retained as opposed to converted (1 pp. 95-6). European deficits could expand free of market influences. The strength of the US dollar, however, was still a potential problem as was the US administration under Harding who was not nearly as tied to the House of Morgan and the British government as was Wilson who was a committed Anglophile. US industrialist Baker Vanderclip, who had led in the world’s largest trade agreement in history with Russia to the tune of $3 billion in 1920, had called Wilson “an autocrat at the inspiration of the British government.” (2) In contrast to Wilson, Harding supported this deal, opposed the League of Nations, established bi-lateral agreements with Russia, Hungary, and Austria in 1921 outside of the control of the League of Nations, and was considering recognizing Russia. Harding died unexpectedly of food poisoning on August 2nd, 1923 after eating “bad oysters” (no autopsy was conducted) (2). Harding was replaced with his vice-president Calvin Coolidge that returned the House of Morgan to power in the United States and adopted policies that generally aligned with the English interests (3).
Around this same time there was another change in policy and policy makers that was also favorable to British interests. After prolonged negotiations Germany and Russia had agreed to an alternative to the Treaty of Versailles with the stated intent to “co-operate in a spirit of mutual goodwill in meeting the economic needs of both countries” (2). The treaty had been negotiated between German industrialist and Foreign Minister Rathaneu and Russian Foreign Minister Georgi Chicherin. The Russia-German Rapallo Treaty was signed on April 16, 1922 and was premised on the forgiveness of war debt and renouncement of territorial claims from either side (2). Rathenau was assassinated on June 24, 1922 by a group known as the Organization Consul that killed over 354 German political figures between 1919 and 1923. They were banned in 1922 but morphed into other paramilitary groups and then into the National Socialist Party (2). After Germany sank into hyper-inflationary economic chaos the treaty lost any practical effect.
The Coolidge and Hoover administrations were deeply tied to the House of Morgan which, in turn, was deeply tied to the British government as was the newly formed Federal Reserve Board under Benjamin Strong (4). It’s notable that Republican administrations prior to Theodore Roosevelt were not aligned with the House of Morgan and this marked a shift back to the Morgan affiliation and British rapprochement policies initiated under Roosevelt’s administration (5). The Morgan’s had long been linked to the British government through their subsidiary Morgan, Greenfield of London. The House of Morgan had been named an official agent of the British Treasury and the Bank of England during WWI and was the sole purchaser of all supplies for the British and French militaries from the US (4) (6).
Ultimately, however, the gold exchange proved to be ineffective as it simply masked the underlying problems and delayed the outcome. Throughout the 1920’s British exports remained depressed and unemployment was severe while the rest of the world was booming. Sterling balances piled up, especially in France, creating a loss in confidence of the jerry-rigged financial system. By 1931 this led to bank failures throughout Europe and France’s attempt to convert their sterling balances for gold forced England to leave the gold standard altogether (1 p. 96). The French economy throughout the 1920’s performed relatively well, in part due to reparations, which enabled them to finance and arm the newly formed Baltic States (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia).
Investment in Germany
In America the rapid monetary expansion undertaken to support the English valuation scheme also financed European and especially German investment so when the US stock market collapsed, and after several months couldn’t be re-inflated and stabilized, it both helped cause and was partially caused by the situation in Europe. Prior to 1924, without their own or borrowed capital, German economic growth could not occur even with unused resources (7 pp. 273-4). German property which is necessary for trade was expropriated along with real estate and other capital goods and a 26% tariff was imposed on all exported goods which went to the victorious states while there were virtually no imported goods (7 p. 274). Germany gave up half their gold supply and this still hardly had an impact. Starting in June 1920 the money supply started to be increased rapidly leading to complete currency collapse by the fall of 1923. Unemployment rose to 30%, industrial output fell by 50%, and food consumption sank to half of prewar levels (2). The collapse was exasperated by those with resources shorting the mark as a hedge against inflation (2).
The Dawes Plan, enacted in 1924, restructured debt and built foreign financing enabling Germany to make reparation payments and more. Money poured into Germany with little regard as to what it was for and whether it could actually be repaid. 55% of these loans came from America indicating a very strong interest by America in supporting Germany and the rest of Europe (8 p. 30). Still the German government and economy was forced to live on foreign loans and German resources were being stripped by foreign actors (7 pp. 275-7). The Dawes Plan was administered by London trained Hjalmar Schacht who was originally dubbed Currency Commissioner and then became President of the Reichsbank (2). He announced a new currency, the retenmark that was set on a fixed rate of exchange with the collapsed reichsmarks of 1 trillion to one wiping out a large quantity of wealth (savings) tied to currency (2). To access foreign capital there was broad privatization of Germany with Anglo-American conglomerates purchasing state business and other assets. Beneficiaries of this included Brown Brothers, Union Bank, Thyssen (German industrialist tied to American investors most notably Prescott Bush and the Bush dynasty), and Standard Oil with JPMorgan and Union Bank taking control Germany’s finance, mining, and industry under the oversight of John Dulles, Montagu Norman, Averill Harriman, and others (2). This was summarized in a famous scene from the movie Judgment Day at Nuremberg. Related austerity measures further degraded the standard of living of the German people. (2)
Money flowed between countries not just for goods but to cover war debt service without economic counter value making a normal balance of trade impossible and drastically distorting the world economy in the 20’s but that came to a sudden end (3). The Dawes Plan, which was followed by the Young Plan in May of 1929 (didn’t go into effect until May 1930 but was made retroactive to September 1, 1929), was partially successful in bringing the Weimar Republic out of hyper-inflation and stabilizing the government and economy by selling the country’s assets until it was suspended by the Hoover administration in May of 1930. All reparations were suspended in 1931 (9) and Hitler came into power in 1932. (7 pp. 275-7) As America withdrew lent capital from Germany, international trade dropped by 60%, German private gross investment dropped by 75%, and German national income dropped by 40%. Export economies in central and southern Europe lost exports and contracted (7 pp. 275-7).
Below is the referenced scene from Judgement Day at Nuremburg recounting western investment in Nazi Germany
1932 and the Abandonment of the Gold Standard
In 1932 FDR was elected president and, while there was still a Morgan presence in his cabinet, they were not dominant and Roosevelt proved to be less of an Anglophile seeing the British as economic adversaries (2). Hitler rose to power in 1932 also but not directly as the result of an election. His Nazi Party did have the largest share of the vote but at 37.2% it was far from a majority and was somewhat regional. Hitler rose to power following a struggle for power with Kurt von Schleicher who was Chancellor prior to Hitler (2). In January of 1933 Schleicher resigned and recommended Hitler be appointed Chancellor. Observing a power struggle between Hitler and Ernst Rohm, Schleicher sought to return to politics the following year but he and his wife were murdered on June 30th 1934 in the “Night of Long Knives” along with Rohm. (Wheeler-Bennett John W, 1967, Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918 – 1945, London, MacMillan, 244-55) It’s commonly believed that the Nazi Party was nearly bankrupt in 1932 which leads to theories on what financial support they had and where it came from.
Several researchers have traced this to American and British backers. Michel Choossudovsky in a paper from 2023 wrote regarding a meeting that others have also cited, “On January 4th, 1932, a meeting was held between British financier Montagu Norman (Governor of the Bank of England), Adolf Hitler and Franz Von Papen (who became Chancellor a few months later in May 1932) At this meeting, an agreement on the financing of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP or Nazi Party) was reached. This meeting was also attended by US policy-makers and the Dulles brothers, something which their biographers do not like to mention” (10). One key person who stayed on in Hitler’s government was Hjalmar Schacht who was reappointed head of the Reichsbank . Schacht met with FDR and other prominent US politicians and financiers in 1933 and after this it appears that US private investment again started flowing to Germany which was accompanied the continued privatization of German assets. The American investment was largely tied to the Rockefeller dynasty and especially Standard Oil (now know as Exxon). Standard Oil bought 730,000 acres of land to develop oil refineries and without this it is doubtful is Nazi Germany would have been able to invade Russia in 1941. (10)
In the summer of 1932 at a conference in Ottawa, Britain formed a currency bloc largely consisting of the commonwealth states which tied their currencies to a pound of sterling as opposed to gold and implemented internal trade privileges and external tariffs (7 pp. 275-7). This was a damaging competitor to the US. The Gold bloc countries kept their currencies tied to gold for a few more years but these currencies became more expensive relative to the pound and dollar causing them to lose exports, income, and employment. The gold losses are so high that France abandoned the gold standard in 1936 and tied the franc to the pound in 1938 which, from the perspective of the US, was joining the enemy camp. (7 p. 277)
In December 1932 there was one final attempt to re-establish a controlled gold standard administered by central banks. A conference was organized by the League of Nations under the guidance of the recently created Bank of International Settlement and the Bank of England. 64 nations participated in the London Economic Conference that was presided over by the British prime minister and was opened by the king of England with the following statement:
“The conference considers it to be essential, in order to provide an international gold standard with the necessary mechanism for satisfactorily working, that independent Central Banks, with requisite powers and freedom to carry out an appropriate currency and credit policy, should be created in such developed countries as have not at present an adequate central banking institution” and that “the conference wish to reaffirm the great utility of close and continuous cooperation between Central Banks. The Bank of International Settlement should play an increasingly important part not only by improving contact, but also as an instrument of common action.” (2)
Stressing the concept of equilibrium, the conference called for a new gold standard controlled by central banks to “maintain a fundamental equilibrium in the balance of payments”. This would have deprived nation states the ability to generate and control credit for their own development therefore tying everything to a western financial structure (2). Unlike what developed after the war, however, this would be structured around England and not the United States. The new Roosevelt administration refused to allow for any US participation in the conference rendering the conference entirely ineffective. Roosevelt expressed that the proposed structure built around globally linked central banks would transfer power from sovereign states to a global financial oligarchy. On February 15, 1933 there was an attempt made on FDR’s life that was thwarted by a woman who knocked the hand of the potential assassin. The shot struck and killed Chicago mayor Anton Cermak who succumbed six days later to sepsis. The assassin was characterized as an anarchist and freemason. (2)
As economies left the gold standard industrialized countries begin to shield their domestic economies, currencies, and specie from foreign competition using tariffs, import quotas, and barter trade agreement (7 p. 276). Banking became profitable again by inflating asset values and debt but the economies generally did not recover as life for ordinary citizens didn’t improve and generally worsened. After the US also left the gold standard in 1933 the US and Britain started using money as an economic weapon allowing the pound and the dollar to sink, promoting exports and loans. The Roosevelt administration and the Federal Reserve allowed the dollar to sink by more the 1/3 in 1934 to promote exports and other counties took similar actions sparking a broad trade war unconstrained by the gold standard (7 pp. 275-7). Unlike modern western economic policy that has not attempted to maintain employment, wages, or industrialization, government policies in this era did attempt to support employment and wages but ultimately all this did was to move unemployment abroad. The expression for this in Britain and America at the time was “beggar-thy-neighbor” and there was a comparable German expression (Mach-meinen-Nachbarn-zum-Bettler-Poltik) (7 p. 276). The initial losers in the economic war are France, other remaining Gold bloc countries, and Germany. By the end of 1932 the US through tariffs and quotas had effectively barred the importation of foreign goods which didn’t have any positive results. When Roosevelt took office he adjusted course demanding that all states open their markets to US goods. “Free trade” was to be free of duties or quotas (7 p. 277)
Below is FDR's first "Fireside Chat" on the Banking System
The German Barter System
Germany during this time followed an entirely different path in dealing with the trade chaos in addition to significant American private investment. Germany, Austria, and many other countries that in the 21st century have come to be referred to as the “Global South” (Middle East, South America, Asia) in that they lacked their own capital and, after 1932, also lacked access to borrow external capital (7 pp. 278-80). Even with foreign capital the interest rates and terms commonly would economically cripple the borrower ultimately resulting in the transfer of both income and assets away from the borrower with the weaker currency making the goal of self-sufficiency increasingly unobtainable. All of these countries were largely dependent on foreign trade which had stagnated causing declining income, unemployment, and broad impoverishment of the population of these countries. The only way for them to ever become self-sufficient was to find a way out of the international financial system that transferred wealth into the global finance centers and ensured they would always remain relatively poor.
Germany adopted two four year plans to break this pattern. The first in 1933 was intended to improve and stabilize the food supply and to improve employment and was primarily internal. The second four year plan was intended to minimize economic dependence on foreign countries and targeted improving raw material supplies (7 pp. 278-80). This would become a threat to existing financial structures and European countries and to America. Science and industry were the key to the first four year plan that enabled the development of products that were previously obtained from abroad and was supported by an artificial currency that was only used internally in Germany allowing for internal interest rates to be dramatically reduced (7 pp. 278-80). Currency exchange with foreign countries was taken out of the private sector and controlled by the state. Profits are dispersed to foreign companies only in the form of goods creating a barter trade arrangement which was the key to the system and was highly effective in creating jobs internally and was insulated to reciprocal trade restrictions. This plan helped drive technologies to replace foreign products that could now be made as opposed to acquired, such as producing large quantities of fuel from agricultural products (mainly potatoes) (7 pp. 278-80). There was some historical precedent for this type of split internal and external currency system. Iron currencies had been used in ancient Greece for transactions within an economic region at different points in time.
The second four year plan addressed foreign trade and the resource limitations that inherently impacted Germany. There were 25 countries in Southeastern Europe, South America, and the Middle East that, like Germany, had weak currencies and which formed bilateral trade agreements with Germany (7 p. 270). These countries had so little foreign currency that the state controlled the exchange of it thereby getting the name “currency control countries”. This completely bypassed the international capital markets by trading goods for goods in what was in effect a barter system without moving currencies or incurring financing charges. For example lenses made in Chile were traded for locomotives made in Germany (7 p. 279). All of the countries involved in this benefited from it but the US, England, and France lost large shares of markets that they had dominated. The economic exchange with South America was a particular threat to the United States which extended to their credit business and this partially explains the deep financial ties between Nazi Germany and many South American countries (7 pp. 279-80). Considering how the US was not recovering there was an additional threat that this model could become increasingly attractive there. By 1938 unemployment in Germany had dropped significantly while national income doubled. Germany may have been on the path to become an economic center at the expense of the countries that won WWI.
Roosevelt’s “Free Trade” Vision
Following the defeat of Poland and France and England declaring war against Germany, there was a period of calm. Germany attempted to negotiate a settlement and offered to withdraw from Poland except for Danzig which had special provisions to protect the German population there and also pull out of Czechoslovakia so long as it became a demilitarized zone. France and England were not interested in further negotiations but the Roosevelt administration did send an envoy to meet with the Germans and attempt to negotiate a “peaceful and Free trade policy” but the Germans were insistent on maintaining the barter based system. Roosevelt was to say later “Will anyone suggest that Germany’s attempt to dominate trade in Central Europe was not a major contributing factor to the war?” (11) English general and historian JFC Fuller echoed this saying:
“Hitler’s dream was therefore an alliance with Great Britain…. Such an alliance was impossible, however, largely because, directly after Hitler’s seizure of power, his economic policies of direct barter trade and subsidies dealt a fatal blow to British and American trade.” JFC Fuller (12)
Roosevelt’s goal in taking this position perhaps could be debated. On one hand he could be seen as an idealist pursuing a future where a real free trade structure could benefit all nations and he clearly did show recognition of the effect foreign financing had on countries with weak currencies. On the other hand it could be contended that this is simply a precursor to the globalist finance and trade structure that was to fully develop after the war. At any rate FDR definitely saw both Britain and the Empire States and Germany as threats and economic enemies and by entering the war on the side of England the US could first neutralize the British through war debt and also resolve the German problem as the result of war itself (7 pp. 279-80).
Much of what is known about Roosevelt’s thinking during this period comes from Correspondence and communication between FDR and his son Elliot captured in the book “As He Saw It”. Elliot Roosevelt was a fairly prolific writer and a military officer during the war. Most of his books are of the mystery genre but this is a key historical record where we see an aging head of state think and act with a surprising degree of independence from his cabinet at many points.
The following account, taken from As He Saw It, of a conflict between FDR and Churchill during the Casablanca Conference gives a clear record of the conflict regarding trade policy that was taking shape after the war along with the role of trade in causing the war:
“Of course,” he [FDR] remarked, with a sly sort of assurance, “of course, after the war, one of the preconditions of any lasting peace will have to be the greatest possible freedom of trade.”
He paused. The P.M.’s head was lowered; he was watching Father steadily, from under one eyebrow.
“No artificial barriers,” Father pursued. “As few favored economic agreements as possible. Opportunities for expansion. Markets open for healthy competition.” His eye wandered innocently around the room.
Churchill shifted in his armchair. “The British Empire trade agreements” he began heavily, “are—”
Father broke in. “Yes. Those Empire trade agreements are a case in point. It’s because of them that the people of India and Africa, of all the colonial Near East and Far East, are still as backward as they are.”
Churchill’s neck reddened and he crouched forward. “Mr. President, England does not propose for a moment to lose its favored position among the British Dominions. The trade that has made England great shall continue, and under conditions prescribed by England’s ministers.”
“You see,” said Father slowly, “it is along in here somewhere that there is likely to be some disagreement between you, Winston, and me.
“I am firmly of the belief that if we are to arrive at a stable peace it must involve the development of backward countries. Backward peoples. How can this be done? It can’t be done, obviously, by eighteenth-century methods. Now—”
“Who’s talking eighteenth-century methods?”
“Whichever of your ministers recommends a policy which takes wealth in raw materials out of a colonial country, but which returns nothing to the people of that country in consideration. Twentieth-century methods involve bringing industry to these colonies. Twentieth-century methods include increasing the wealth of a people by increasing their standard of living, by educating them, by bringing them sanitation—by making sure that they get a return for the raw wealth of their community.”
Around the room, all of us were leaning forward attentively. Hopkins was grinning. Commander Thompson, Churchill’s aide, was looking glum and alarmed. The P.M. himself was beginning to look apoplectic.
“You mentioned India,” he growled.
“Yes. I can’t believe that we can fight a war against fascist slavery, and at the same time not work to free people all over the world from a backward colonial policy.”
“What about the Philippines?”
“I’m glad you mentioned them. They get their independence, you know, in 1946. And they’ve gotten modern sanitation, modern education; their rate of illiteracy has gone steadily down…”
“There can be no tampering with the Empire’s economic agreements.”
“They’re artificial…”
“They’re the foundation of our greatness.” (2) (11)
The dialogue continued the next day:
“Mr. President,” he cried, “I believe you are trying to do away with the British Empire. Every idea you entertain about the structure of the postwar world demonstrates it. But in spite of that”—and his forefinger waved—”in spite of that, we know that you constitute our only hope. And”—his voice sank dramatically—”you know that we know it. You know that we know that without America, the Empire won’t stand.”
Churchill admitted, in that moment, that he knew the peace could only be won according to precepts which the United States of America would lay down. And in saying what he did, he was acknowledging that British colonial policy would be a dead duck, and British attempts to dominate world trade would be a dead duck, and British ambitions to play off the U.S.S.R. against the U.S.A. would be a dead duck. Or would have been, if Father had lived.” Elliot Roosevelt (11)
Of course, he didn’t live and we will never fully know what would have happened if he had. The pound, the franc, and the marc all wound up coupled to the dollar which was tied to 0.7 grams of gold until 1971 when it became tied to nothing. The US was from that point on able to finance its imports with dollars it printed without first earning the money to buy imported products almost universally in dollars. This path started in the 1930’s (7 p. 282)
The trade war of the 1930’s is in many ways difficult to definitively interpret in large part because it involved not just fairly advanced economics but also the resolution of motive and intent of people who now lived several generations in the past. It’s easier and probably more satisfying to look at the war in strictly philosophical terms but the economic conflict of the 1930’s can’t be overlooked without trivializing the complexity of the conflict. When US Secretary of State in the Roosevelt administration Cordell Hull repeatedly pointed out that the monetary and economic conflicts of the 1930’s were the major cause of WWII (13 p. 81), he may very well have been right.
Below is a video addressing the Roosevelt Wallace post war vision. This should be viewed critically and isn't presented here as fact.
Bibliography
1. Rothbard, Murray N. What Has Government Done to Our Money. Auburn Alabama : Mises Institute, 1963.
2. Ehret, Mathew J.L. Hyperinflation, Facism, and War. The Saker (Reprinted on Lew Rockwell). [Online] September 21, 2020. https://www.lewrockwell.com/2020/09/no_author/hyperinflation-fascism-and-war-how-the-new-world-order-may-be-defeated-once-more/.
3. Rothbard, Murray N. Wall Street, Banks, and American Foreign Policy. Lew Rockwell. [Online] 1984. https://www.lewrockwell.com/1970/01/murray-n-rothbard/wall-street-wars/.
4. —. A History of Money and Banking in the United States. Auburn Alabama : Misses Institute, 2002.
5. Poe, Richard. How the British Invented Communism (And Blamed It on the Jews). [Online] Jan 10, 2023. https://richardpoe.substack.com/p/how-the-british-invented-communism?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2#footnote-3-95903021.
6. Docherty, Gerry and Macgregor, Jim. Hidden History: The Secret Origins of the First World War. EDinburgh, Scotland : Mainstream Publishing, 2013.
7. Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd. 1939 - The War the had Many Fathers. Munchen, Germany : Olzag Verlag GmBh, 2011.
8. Tansill, Charles Callan. Backdood to War. s.l. : Ostara Publications, 1952.
9. Trueman, C N. History Learning Site. [Online] Nay 22, 2015. https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/weimar-germany/the-young-plan-of-1929/.
10. Chossudovsky, Michel and Rubstov, Yuri. Substack. Adolph Hitler Was Financed by Wall Street, the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. [Online] February 26, 2024. https://michelchossudovsky.substack.com/p/history-adolph-hitler-was-financed.
11. Roosevelt, Elliott. As He Saw It. New York : Duell, Sloan, & Pierce, 1946.
12. Fuller, J.F.C. The Second World War: A Strategic and Tactical History. s.l. : Da Capo Press, 1954.
13. Hull, Cordell. Memoirs Vol I. New York : Oxford Press, 1948.