The Foreign Information Service, which was staffed by interventions, weren’t embarrassed by the leak but amplified the story abroad.  In a few days war with Japan would largely wipe the incident from the collective memory but the Victory Plan hardly addressed Japan which was to be handled by defensive strategies short of war (1 p. 14). In order to bring the U.S into the war, Roosevelt needed some external event that would directly or indirectly lead to Germany declaring war first and a war with Japan where Japan would make the first move provided the most likely path (2 pp. 622-5). Secretary of the Interior Ickes wrote to Roosevelt in the spring of 1941, “To embargo oil to Japan would be as popular a move in all parts of the country as you could make. There might develop . . . a situation as would make it not only possible but easy to get into the war in an effective way” (1 pp. 16-17).  Ickes, who was also the Petroleum Coordinator, unilaterally suspended all petroleum shipments to Japan.

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Several months later Ickes, still believing that starting a war with Japan was the solution to the intervention problem, wrote in his diary on October 18, 1941, “For a long time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of Japan . . . And, of course, if we go to war against Japan, it will inevitably lead us to war against Germany” (3 p. 589), (1 p. 17).  In response to the seizure of south French Indonesia in mid-1941, Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the United States which had already been done to Germany and Italy. The Japanese, who were largely dependent on the U.S economically, had to obtain a license for any item that had a potential military use first to buy it and then to release the funds to pay for it. At the State Department, Dean Acheson oversaw this process and saw to it that the request processing was so slow it became an effective silent embargo starting in August of 1941. Acheson was a liberal, although not a strong Roosevelt supporter, and a committed Anglophile and interventionist.  There is some question as to what Roosevelt’s position on these actions really was although it certainly served his ends. Roosevelt traveled in August to Newfoundland to meet with Churchill and returned on September 5th, at which point he persuaded Secretary of State Hull not to alter Acheson’s policy saying it would be a sign of weakness.(1 pp. 18-19)

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The steps that led to the oil embargo were themselves complex and full of intrigue and clear insubordination. In late 1938, Harry Price, who was the founder of a China Lobby committee with a collection of high profile people, asked the original wise man, Henry Stimson to join his committee and he accepted (4 p. 188).  The committee, known as the American Committee for American nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression, over the next two years would convince the American public that oil exports to Japan could be embargoed with no reprisals.  Harry Price gave the group an American missionary face and Stimson was made honorary chairman which was a huge coup for the Soong’s and Chiang (4 p. 188). They were not only embedded in the Roosevelt administration but had as a figurehead leader one of the most influential people in the country. The committee cranked out a continual stream of press releases that weren’t only spread in the media but by churches and church affiliated organizations across the country. Morgenthau fully bought into the idea of embargoing oil and other materials to the Japanese but FDR rightfully feared that doing so would force the conflict south into Indonesia.

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Chiang wanted money to fight Mao while FDR believed Chiang needed money to fight the Japanese. American funding was especially important in that Stalin’s Russia had been providing support for Chiang in the form of low interest loans, all forms of military equipment, and advisors in order to protect Russia’s eastern flank from Japan but with a German conflict in the west becoming more likely, they could no longer afford this.  The Treasury Dept proposed a loan of $35 million dollars that Hull solidly opposed having determined that Chiang was incompetent and corrupt (4 pp. 191-2). Morgenthau contested Hull’s position saying, “I am taking the liberty of pleading China’s cause so earnestly because you have three times told me to proceed with the proposals for assistance to China. All my efforts have proved of no avail against Secretary Hull’s adamant policy of doing nothing which could possibly be objected to by an aggressor nation.”(5) Morgenthau arranged a meeting with Roosevelt that Hull could not attend because he was at sea and got the loan proposal approved. Hull learned of this four days later. (4 pp. 193-4) Roosevelt’s new direction in China policy would now guide events and it wasn’t just not debated; it was also unannounced. The China lobby saw the loan as only the beginning in an anticipated chain of cash infusions. The China Lobby had taken over FDR’s own household with Sara Delano Roosevelt being chairwoman of both the China Aid Council and American Committee for Chinese War Orphans and Eleanor Roosevelt being honorary chairwoman of Pearl Buck’s China Emergency Relief Committee.

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Roosevelt came to believe there was a real chance of Japan controlling China and that the loss of China would free Japanese troop strength to go after Indonesia and Southeast Asia so the Chinese conflict came to take on strategic as well as political implications. The US transferred its Pacific fleet from California to Hawaii to convey a message of deterrence to Japan. Admiral James Richardson argued against this saying that this would only provoke the Japanese. Roosevelt’s response was. “Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the fleet in the Hawaiian area has had, and is now having, a restraining influence on the actions of Japan.” (4 p. 201)(6 pp. 38-9) Japanese admiral Isoroku Yamamoto interpreted this a bit differently. He told a colleague, “The fact that the United States has brought a great fleet to Hawaii to show us that it’s within striking distance of Japan means, conversely, that we’re within striking distance too.” (4 p. 201)(7)

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Roosevelt increasingly became caught in a political trap largely of his own doing. The Republican candidate running against him in 1940 was Wendell Willkie who took an isolationist position portraying FDR as a warmonger and making claims like “You may expect war by April of 1941 if [Roosevelt] is elected”(8 p. 254) and Willkie was gaining in the polls. Democratic leadership was concerned enough about this that they urged Roosevelt to take a strong and definitive non-intervention stance. Countering this Roosevelt appointed two interventionalist Republicans more in the mold of the eastern establishment or Rockefeller wing of the party, Henry Stimson and Frank Knox, as Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy. These nominations were made on the eve of the Republican convention and were politically expedient but in doing this he created a cabinet where both the right wing and the left wing, led by Morgenthau, were aligned against him specifically on the issue of China. (4 p. 202) The Soong’s and Chiang were completely aware at this point that FDR and Secretary of State Hull had no intention of supporting them either directly or indirectly but they were now in a position to work around that by effectively controlling FDR’s cabinet which was increasingly anti-Japan.  The China Lobby and the Stimson committee led the passage of the National Defense Act signed on July 2nd, 1940 which gave the administration control of valuable natural resources.  Stimson saw this as a potential measure to be used against Japan while FDR still had no intention of cutting Japan’s oil. (4 pp. 201-2)  Meanwhile the American public was strongly in support of the Chinese, which they equated with Chiang, and still opposed intervention believing that they could have one without the other.

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When the oil exports stopped it was clear to the Japanese that they weren’t getting any oil and it was fairly apparent to not just the main players, but the public in general saw that we were on a fast track to war. During this time most or all Japanese communications were intercepted (these were referred to as the purple intercepts) so it’s hard to believe that Roosevelt wasn’t fully aware of the Japanese policy debates and decisions (1 pp. 19-21). The Purple intercepts, code-named “Magic,” revealed that Japan was internally torn between an expansionist army, a cautious navy (led by Nomura), and moderate politicians who lived in constant fear of assassination by military extremists (1 p. 16). Roosevelt’s unwillingness to realistically negotiate with civilian politicians significantly weakened their position relative to the military (4 p. 180)

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Back and forth negotiations didn’t bring about any realistic possibilities for resolution until Hull allowed the peacemakers to put together a final proposal that had some potential. It offered Japan a $2 Billion loan and renewal of shipments of oil and other minerals and metals if Japan agreed to end the war in China on neutral negotiated terms. Interventionists in the State Department and War Department weakened the proposal to the point where it became feeble (1 p. 21). What negotiations were taking place were led by Secretary Hull and Roosevelt remained distant from the process. 

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On December 7th, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and a lingering question is what did Roosevelt or the administration or military know and when did they know it?  Was the fleet put in this vulnerable position to bait an attack? Roosevelt was clearly responsible for placing the ships at Pearl Harbor having ignored a strong warning from the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet Admiral James O. Richardson who wanted to keep the ships in San Diego. Roosevelt referred to the placement of warships in Pear Harbor as a “restraining influence” (1 p. 42). Richardson was replaced by Admiral Kimmel who maintained throughout his life that he never received adequate warning.  Kimmel’s 113 page battle plan, which was approved by the Chief of Naval Operation Harold Stark and remained an unused historical artifact for decades, was focused entirely on offensive strategy.  The fleet was to go to sea on the following Monday in search of a decisive battle. (5), (1 p. 43)

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While it is clear that Roosevelt wanted and expected an attack somewhere, there is more evidence that he didn’t anticipate an attack in Hawaii although its entirely plausible that the administration and/or the military knew or should have known that an attack was in progress well before it became obvious.  On December 1st, FDR summoned British Ambassador Halifax where he warned of a Japanese attack in the South China Sea and concluded that “we all need to stick together” (6 pp. 217-8)(1 pp. 23-24). Instead of searching the South China Sea with aircraft, Roosevelt cabled Manila to outfit a ship called the Lanikai and two smaller ships to search the South China Sea for Japanese warships and transports.  The ship could do only 17 knots and had no real communication capability. Was this supposed to create the incident to start the war? (7 p. 46), (1 p. 24). The idea of attacking Pearl Harbor by air was originally developed by American Admiral Harry Ervin Yarnell, who commanded America’s first two aircraft carriers, while on fleet maneuvers off Hawaii in 1932. Roosevelt’s determination not to take this as a serious possibility could well relate to his belief that Japanese were inherently inferior to Anglo culture and intellect and were incapable of executing such an attack with the skill of the Americans or British (1 pp. 44-5). The administration was shocked at the capability of the Japanese weapon systems and their ability to execute such a complex plan. The shallow water torpedoes were particularly impressive.

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The news of the attack on Pearl Harbor came down during a large anti-war rally and this and subsequent events effectively crushed and scattered the anti-interventionist forces.  Still this was only the first step and what would have to happen next was beyond the ability of the Roosevelt administration to directly control. Germany and Japan had no real alliance or significant military or economic linkage. Had Japan been willing to engage Russia from the east and open some level of a second front they would have but after Russia obliterated Japan’s 6th Army in Mongolia in 1939, Japan seemed to have absolutely no interest in doing this. In the orders to deploy the Lanikai it was clear the President was fearful that a small incident in the China Sea may not be enough to cause Congress to declare war on Japan and he would use up all his political capital on the first move. With the large-scale attack on Pearl Harbor, however, that was no longer a problem. (1 pp. 25-6)