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Rise of the New Right and the Neoconservatives​

Jim Pederson   November 1, 2024

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From the end of WWII to the 1960’s the definition of what it meant to be conservative would undergo a drastic change. The significance of free market economics would be gradually diminished and the isolationist views of the Old Right would be replaced with an aggressive foreign policy that was designed to counter the perceived threat that Soviet Communism posed to Christianity and America.  This threat would lead to a permanent military mobilization and the large and powerful “military industrial complex” that went with it. This happened in steps starting with the displacement of the Old Right and ending with the ascent of the Neoconservatives who came to control the Republican Party by the 1980's.

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The Last Stand of the Old Right

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While “Vital Center” policies were aggressively implemented by Truman, frequently without congressional approval, the libertarian and isolationist “Old Right” had one more attempt to rise to power. Instead of demobilizing, as had happened after WWI, The Truman administration maintained a wartime mobilization that would be very difficult to displace. The progressive left, including Henry Wallace, had gone along with the Korean venture in the interest of “collective security”.  The right wing Republicans were the only organized group to oppose Truman’s policies but they were extremely strong in the House of Representatives fighting conscription, the creation of NATO, and the “Truman Doctrine” (1 pp. 87-8). The Old Right was led by Senator Taft of Ohio who was to challenge Eisenhower for the Republican nomination in1952. Nebraska congressman Howard Buffet, who was to be Taft’s Midwestern campaign manager in 52 (1 p. 88), was one of the Old Right’s strongest spokesmen. He summed up the opposing view of the Truman doctrine on the floor of Congress by saying:  “Even if it were desirable, America is not strong enough to police the world by military force. If that attempt is made, the blessings of liberty will be replaced by coercion and tyranny at home. Our Christian ideals cannot be exported to other lands by dollars and guns. … We cannot practice might and force abroad and retain freedom at home. We cannot talk world cooperation and practice power politics” (2). This remains a concise and powerful summary of anti-interventionist foreign policy and stands in stark contrast to the globalist position that through democracy and military force, the world can be reshaped around western culture. It also prophesies that if the US follows this course, instead of changing the culture of the rest of the World, our culture will be changed and will ultimately be lost in the process.

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The policies enacted during the Truman administration, which grew out of the “Wise men” in the Roosevelt administration were an initial large step away from the post war vision of FDR and Hull as graphically depicted in the following table:

Senator Taft opposed the cold war and the creation of NATO reasoning that a massive standing army surrounding Russia from Norway to the Middle East would lead Russia to conclude that a buffer of satellite countries was necessary for their own defense. The interventionist side was led by Senator John Dulles, closely connected to Wall Street and the Rockefeller family, and brother of Allan Dulles.  Taft, along with many interventionist Republicans, opposed mounting US involvement in Asia defeating Truman’s $60 million aid bill for South Korea by one vote (1 p. 92). This decision however was reversed by the efforts of Representative Walter Judd (R, Minn), who was a former missionary and leader of the China lobby in Congress. For the Old Right the Korean War was to be the final fight, the “hill to die on”.  The entire liberal and progressive left, except for the communists, had bought into the concept of UN authority and “collective security against aggression” (1 p. 92). Representative Howard Buffet and others of the Old Right were convinced that the US was largely responsible for initiating the conflict in Korea based on secret testimony by Admiral Hillenkoeter, who was head of the CIA.  He tried for the rest of his life to get this testimony declassified and released but that never happened. Hillenkoeter was fired by Truman after this incident (1 p. 93).

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At the opening of the 1951 Congress, Senators Wherry and Taft submitted resolutions prohibiting the President from sending troops abroad without the approval of Congress, as is inferred from the constitution, and further challenged Truman’s refusal to accept a cease fire to negotiate a peace settlement. In 1950 the US suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Chinese driving US forces out of North Korea.  The “Great Debate” ensued where elder statesmen Herbert Hoover followed by Joseph P. Kennedy (patriarch of the Kennedy family) delivered coordinated back-to-back speeches calling for American evacuation of Korea and an end to the war. Kennedy had been a lifelong isolationist or anti-imperialist, maintaining extremely consistent positions on foreign policy that ran contrary to those of FDR and the “vital center” consensus (1 pp. 95-6).

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Former ambassador Kennedy started off by saying: “From the start I had no patience with a policy that without due regard to our resources—human and material—would make commitments abroad that we could not fulfill. As Ambassador to London in 1939 I had seen the folly of this when the British made their commitment to Poland that they could not fulfill and have not yet fulfilled—a commitment that brought them into war. I naturally opposed Communism, but said if portions of Europe or Asia were to go Communistic or even had Communism thrust upon them, we cannot stop it. Instead we must make sure of our strength and be certain not to fritter it away in battles that could not be won” (3). He forecast that communism would collapse economically and the communist bloc would break apart naturally in time and concluded global intervention was a doomed policy and that isolation was the only viable alternative for America (1 p. 96).

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Herbert Hoover followed up on the Kennedy speech eight days later with a nationwide network radio address.  His wording was not as strong as Kennedy’s but he warned against an endless unwinnable war that would ultimately bring the end of western civilization saying: “We must face the fact that to commit the sparse ground forces of the non-Communist nations into a land war against this Communist land mass would be a war without victory, a war without a successful terminal. Any attempt to make war on the Communist mass by land invasion, through the quicksands of China, India or Western Europe, is sheer folly. That would be the graveyard of millions of American boys and would end in the exhaustion of this Gibraltar of Western Civilization” (4). The reaction of the liberal establishment, the Truman administration, and corporatist Republicans like Dewey and Foster Dulles was one of disgust.  The new Republic and the Nation, influential political journals, resorted to “red-baiting” inferring they were tools of the Kremlin. They were especially incensed about the isolationist’s condemnation of the US participation in the Korean War. (1 pp. 100-01)

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Two other conservative isolationist voices writing during this time were George Morgenstern and Garet Garret (pen name for Edward Peter Garrett who eventually took on the pen name) making arguments that would be very current in the early 21st century. In the right-wing Washington Weekly Human Events, which was still open to isolationist material but was drifting towards what would be the “New Right” Morgenstern summed up a century of aggressive American foreign policy stating:

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“At the end of the 19th century the United States began to stir with those promptings of imperialism and altruism which have worked to the mischief of so many puissant states. The sinister Spaniard provided a suitable punching bag. Two days before McKinley went to Congress with a highly misleading message which was an open invitation to war, the Spanish government had agreed to the demands for an armistice in Cuba and American mediation. There was no good reason, but there was war anyway. We wound up the war with a couple of costly dependencies, but this was enough to intoxicate the precursors of those who now swoon on very sight of the phrase “world leadership.” McKinley testified that in lonely sessions on his knees at night he had been guided to the realization that we must “uplift and civilize and Christianize” the Filipinos. He asserted that the war had brought new duties and responsibilities “which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.” This sort of exalted nonsense is familiar to anyone who later attended the evangelical rationalizations of Wilson for intervening in the European war, of Roosevelt promising the millennium … of Eisenhower treasuring the “crusade in Europe” that somehow went sour, or of Truman, Stevenson, Paul Douglas, or the New York Times preaching the holy war in Korea. . . . An all-pervasive propaganda has established a myth of inevitability in American action: all wars were necessary, all wars were good. The burden of proof rests with those who contend that America is better off, that American security has been enhanced, and that prospects of world peace have been improved by American intervention in four wars in half a century. Intervention began with deceit by McKinley; it ends with deceit by Roosevelt and Truman. Perhaps we would have a rational foreign policy … if Americans could be brought to realize that the first necessity is the renunciation of the lie as an instrument of foreign policy.” (5)

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In this piece Morgenstern made very direct and repeated references to Yankee progressive evangelicalism, cultural imperialism, and the postmillennial vision of uniting the world in the image of America – the redeemer nation.  Another excellent commentary that has stood the test of time was “The Rise of Empire” by Garrett where he observed that we “have crossed the boundary that lies between Republic and Empire” (1 p. 103). He identified five hallmarks of empire that are summarized as follows:

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Executive Dominance:  He started out by pointing the usurpation of congressional power by the executive branch which has become a repetitive process in the decades since then, saying: “After President Truman, alone and without either the consent or knowledge of Congress, had declared war on the Korean aggressor, 7,000 miles away, Congress condoned his usurpation of its exclusive Constitutional power to declare war. More than that, his political supporters in Congress argued that in the modern case that sentence in the Constitution conferring upon Congress the sole power to declare war was obsolete” (6 pp. 122-3).  He then referenced Rome as it passed from a republic to an empire:  “Caesar might have said it to the Roman Senate,” and that this logic “stands as a forecast of executive intentions, a manifestation of the executive mind, a mortal challenge to the parliamentary principle.” (6 pp. 128-33)

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Domestic Policy becomes subordinate to foreign policy: Comparing the US to Rome as well as to the British Empire (1 p. 105). “This is what happened to Rome, and to the British Empire. It is also happening to us, for as we convert the nation into a garrison state to build the most terrible war machine that has ever been imagined on earth, every domestic policy is bound to be conditioned by our foreign policy. The voice of government is saying that if our foreign policy fails we are ruined. It is all or nothing. Our survival as a free nation is at hazard. That makes it simple, for in that case there is no domestic policy that may not have to be sacrificed to the necessities of foreign policy—even freedom. … If the cost of defending not ourselves alone but the whole non-Russian world threatens to wreck our solvency, still we must go on” (6 p. 139).  He foresaw permanent changes in American life that were cited in a NY Times Editorial on October 31 of 1951 that said in part:  “We are embarking on a partial mobilization for which about a hundred billion dollars have been already made available. We have been compelled to activate and expand our alliances at an ultimate cost of some twenty-five billion dollars, to press for rearmament of former enemies and to scatter our own forces at military bases throughout the world. Finally, we have been forced not only to retain but to expand the draft and to press for a system of universal military training which will affect the lives of a whole generation.” (6 pp. 140-41)

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Ascendency of the military mind: Garrett cited the creation of the pentagon as an example of the “forethought of perpetual war” where “global strategy is conceived; there, nobody knows how, the estimates of what it will cost are arrived at; and surrounding it is our own iron curtain.”  He then cited a quote from General MacArthur: “Talk of imminent threat to our national security through the application of external force is pure nonsense. … Indeed, it is a part of the general patterns of misguided policy that our country is now geared to an arms economy which was bred in an artificially induced psychosis of war hysteria and nurtured upon an incessant propaganda of fear. While such an economy may produce a sense of seeming prosperity for the moment, it rests on an illusionary foundation of complete unreliability and renders among our political leaders almost a greater fear of peace than is their fear of war” (6 pp. 148-9)

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Development of satellite countries:  Garrett observed that the US, like Russia, has satellite nations arguing “When people say we have lost China or that if we lose Europe it will be a disaster, what do they mean? How could we lose China or Europe, since they never belonged to us? What they mean is that we have lost or may lose a following of dependent people who act as an outer guard.”  This then creates a society based on fear as a patriotic obsession saying “It is stronger than any political party. … The basic conviction is simple. We cannot stand alone. A capitalistic economy, though it possesses half the industrial power of the whole world, cannot defend its own hemisphere” (6 pp. 15-55). 

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Complex vaunting and fear: Building on the previous concept he contends that the United States saw itself as a “prisoner of history” where it is “our turn”. To which he asks “Our turn to do what?...Our turn to keep the peace…Our turn to save civilization, our turn to serve mankind… But this is the language of Empire. The Roman Empire never doubted that it was the defender of civilization. Its good intentions were peace, law and order. The Spanish Empire added salvation. The British Empire added the noble myth of the white man’s burden. We have added freedom and democracy. Yet the more that may be added to it the more it is the same language still. A language of power.” (6 pp. 158-9)

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These two writings are included here in some detail because they are both reflective of this specific period of history and also, in many respects, timeless. Yet history is typically defined by more practical matters of economics and power.  Taft was to lose the Republican nomination to Eisenhower. Many felt that Taft was cheated out of the nomination with powerful corporations exerting heavy influence over a large number of uncommitted delegates to support Eisenhower (1 p. 123).  Chesly Manly described the Taft defeat in the Chicago Tribune two years later as follows:

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“New York banks, connected with the country’s great corporations by financial ties and interlocking directorates, exerted their powerful influence on the large uncommitted delegations for Eisenhower. They did it more subtly, but no less effectively, than in 1940 when they captured the Republican convention for Willkie. Having made enormous profits out of foreign aid and armaments orders, the bankers and corporation bosses understood each other perfectly. The Wall Street influence was most fruitful in the Pennsylvania delegation … and in that of Michigan. … Arthur Summer-field, Michigan’s national committeeman and the largest Chevrolet dealer in the world, was rewarded for his delivery of the bulk of the Michigan delegation by appointment as Eisenhower’s campaign manager and later as his Postmaster General. Charles E. Wilson, President of the General Motors Corporation, which had strong influence in the Michigan delegation, became Secretary of Defense. Winthrop W. Aldrich, head of the Chase National Bank and kinsman of the Rockefeller brothers, the front man for Wall Street, was in Chicago pulling wires for Eisenhower, and his labors paid off with an appointment as ambassador to Great Britain” (7 pp. 20-21)

Eastern Establishment Republicans Retain Control of the Party

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Eisenhower’s election established the dominance of the eastern Republican establishment that has generally controlled the party until the era of Trump. Up until this time, there remained hope of reversing some of the provisions of the New Deal specifically in the area of social legislation and direct payments to individuals but the Republicans accepted the reasoning that the electorate wanted these things and they would just attempt to manage them efficiently. This cemented the fundamental changes in the role of government enacted by the New Dealers as permanent (8 p. 280). Writing in Newsweek in 1954 Earnest K Lindley described the Eisenhower brand of new conservatism as having

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 “ratified most of the major tenets of the New Deal and rejected completely the thesis that depressions are a natural phenomenon which from time to time must be endured…He embraced the idea that the Federal Government has responsibilities for the welfare of the individual citizen.  The direction of his domestic policies is not surprising.  It reflects the philosophy of the wing of the Republican Party that was primarily responsible for his nomination as well as a large sector of the Democratic Party. The Eisenhower program is designed to sap enough strength of the Democratic Party and to annex the independent voters necessary to keep the Republican Party in power….Mr. Eisenhower’s economic philosophy is essentially conservative.  By any broad test his social program is conservative.  But both involve the use of methods which were generally opposed by conservatives twenty years ago and are not endorsed by some today… Together they set forth a new conservative program.” (9 p. 32)

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Shortly before his death in July of 1953 Senator Taft had one final verbal assault on John Dulles, now Secretary of State, who was the icon of anti-communist global intervention and deeply tied to his former law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell where he was long time counselor for the Rockefellers.  In his speech on May 26 of 1953 Taft addressed Dulles’ policy of expanding US involvement in Southeast Asia where the US was then covering 70% of the cost to support the French backed regime against Ho Chi Minh’s forces predicting that the US would eventually send ground forces there to replace the faltering French and become the colonial power in the region (1 pp. 123-5). Immediately following Taft’s death, American support for the French backed government greatly increased with Dulles and Vice President Nixon advocating direct American bombing of the insurgents.  Eisenhower however was not willing to go this far without consent of congress. His brief association with Taft during and after the campaign and the presence of Taft supporters in his cabinet like George Humphrey had an influence on Eisenhower (1 pp. 125-6)and may have been a factor in his warning of the “military industrial complex”.

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The last attempted political act of the Old Right was the Bicker Amendment, named after Senator John W. Bicker of Ohio, which would prevent international treaties and executive agreements from becoming the supreme law of the land and overriding previous internal law or provisions of the Constitution.  Bicker became the leader of the Old Right after Taft’s death and had been the Old Right’s presidential candidate in 1948.  The amendment was opposed by Secretary of State Dulles and Attorney General Herbert Brownell followed by all the forces of organized liberalism including the Americans for Democratic Action, the AFL, B’nai B’rith, the American Jewish Congress, the American Association for the United Nations, and the United World Federalists (1 p. 140). The final vote on the Bricker Amendment came in the U.S. Senate in February 1954 with the Amendment going down to a severe defeat.

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By the mid 50’s the final end was drawing near for the Old Right. Some tried to launch a third party, the Constitution Party to be led by General Douglas MacArthur to challenge Eisenhower in 1956.  There was actually an attempt made in 52 to do this when Taft lost the nomination but it ran out of time. The Cold War foreign policy of the Dulles brothers calling for permanent mass armament and “massive nuclear retaliation”, however, was becoming broadly accepted as the New Right started to gradually consume the Old Right (1 pp. 127-30). Two of their last dying utterances came from the For America political action group in 1955 and in an all isolationist issue of Faith and Freedom in 1954. For America was headed by the Dean of the Notre Dame School of Law, Clarence Manion, that issued a platform to “abolish conscription” and “enter no foreign war unless the safety of the United States is directly threatened” (1 p. 139).  Faith and Freedom included an article by Garet Garrett titled The “Suicidal Impulse” which was an extension of “The Rise of Empire” (1 p. 130). 

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Faith and Freedom along with the parent organization Spiritual Mobilization collapsed in the late 50’s losing the orthodox conservative Christian foundation of the movement. The leadership of the organization drifted into various forms of eastern thought and paranormal mysticism under the influence of neo-Buddhist mystic Gerald Herald. As the 50’s drew to a close, the libertarian Old Right had again become almost invisible without any platforms to speak from or political allies. The isolationist (or anti-imperialist) position would not again gain national attention until the presidential campaigns of Ron Paul and then Donald Trump.

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The video clip below is of Eisenhower's farwell speech addressing the dangers of the "military industrial complex".

Assessing the Russian Threat

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The New Right was really built around the Russian threat and the Cold War to which much of the country and the world were economic stakeholders. The Cold War was of great economic importance to the military, military contractors, second and third tier contractors, communities that were home to military bases and military contractors, and even colleges and universities indirectly. This is what Eisenhower warned of in his farewell address as “the military industrial complex”.  Military contracts would typically be dispersed across as many states and house districts as possible to make them politically difficult to cancel. The American economy was and still is largely formed around it, although the Soviet Union is long since gone, and the dependency would run through all income ranges.  The Warfare State transferred a great deal of wealth into large corporations and urban areas that acted as engineering and manufacturing hubs effectively transferring this wealth from rural areas similar to Stalin’s industrialization program in the 20’s and 30’s except that the overall level of wealth was much higher to begin with. It also acted as a publically funded research and development program for commercial spinoff products which were numerous ranging from commercial aviation to microwaves. Those who benefited directly, which would be a large segment of the population, would justify this sort of economy and then gradually rationalize it.  Like the programs of the New Deal, however, while the military economy had specific benefactors, those hurt by it would have been a substantially larger number but were unnamed and unknown. While there is a great deal of self interest at play here, there were certainly people who firmly believed this was the right policy just as the Old Right believed interventionist policies would gradually bring the country to ruin.  So who was right?

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For the Cold War to be justified based on a threat to America or the West, first the Soviets would have to have intent to expand into Europe and possibly further to establish a global revolution, and they must have been capable of doing so. It was true that for sometime after the conclusion of WWII the European countries lacked the military capability to resist a Soviet invasion.  This was largely due to the destruction of Germany which was, in turn, due to Roosevelt’s policy of unconditional surrender so this was to a large degree another self inflicted wound. But while the Soviets could possibly conquer Europe if American forces were to completely withdraw, the indications are they couldn’t control it. They were already having difficulty with some of their satellites like Tito in Yugoslavia (1 pp. 97-8). There wasn’t any broad support of the communists in most of Europe, especially among the under classes, and the Soviets grasped this fairly quickly which seemed to guide their actions (10). If the intent of the Soviets was to aggressively expand westward their best opportunity would have been in the years immediately after the war yet they didn’t. The Soviets took several years to impose communist regimes in Eastern Europe, well after the Cold War had started, and even that wasn’t consistent.  Poland was aggressively anti-Soviet and this led Stalin to take full control of Poland.  Contrasting this to Finland, however, Finish statesman Paasikivi pursued a policy of conservative agrarianism at home and a non-aggressive foreign policy with the Soviets.  Stalin left them alone and withdrew his army (1 pp. 180-1).  This doesn’t in any way justify the occupation of Poland but does give an indication of the decision making process behind Soviet policy. Stalin scuttled the Communists of Greece in a deal with Churchill which prevented the Communist partisans of Italy and France from taking power at the end of the war. He attempted to restrain Communist movements in Yugoslavia and China by forcing Tito and Mao into coalition regimes but they were not dependent on the Soviet Army or economy (1 pp. 180-1) and disregarded the Soviet direction. The standard interpretation of the conflict between Trotsky and Stalin was that Stalin wanted communism in one country while Trotsky wanted a world revolution and Stalin won that struggle (11). Whether that is entirely true or not at that time can be argued but by 50’s it was entirely clear that the Soviets were not seeking world hegemony and were at worst seeking regional hegemony that stopped in Eastern Europe.

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The Old Right had argued that the ultimate constraint on Marxism that would lead to its collapse was economic. If this was true, the Soviet state would collapse under its own weight in a relatively short period of time (no more than two or three decades) and the economic disparities between the Soviet bloc and the west would rapidly become wider and wider to the point where the threat they posed would be continually decreasing.  Analysis available at the time strongly indicated if not established that this was the case although the point seemed to be lost on the New Right that saw only military options.  By the early 1960s there were already encouraging changes in Yugoslavia, which after breaking with the Soviets, had moved away from socialism and central planning and in the direction of the free market.  Other Eastern Europeans and even the Soviet Union were starting to emulate this (1 pp. 184-5).

A final argument in favor of the Cold War could perhaps be made on the basis that the Soviet Marxists were so evil in afflicting their own people and spreading the ideology across the globe, even if they would never be able to ultimately control it themselves, that America and Britain had an obligation to launch a moral crusade to eradicate it. The Soviet communists, who were fully accepted by the American left until the final stages of World War II, represented a dysfunctional economic system, internal tyranny, and repression of religion. Marxism is in many ways a tragic, secularized parody of Christianity. Could foreign military intervention possibly resolve this especially considering all sides had nuclear arsenals? Not liking something does not necessarily provide an opportunity to forcibly eradicate it but, if the adversary really is evil, it will generally fall apart naturally. At a geopolitical level, economics in time always overcomes political policies and dictates and, in one way or another, fixes things without military intervention. It may take patience but doesn’t create the long term dislocations and unintended consequences that always follow military conquest.   In trying to destroy an enemy there is a real tendency to, in time; acquire the same characteristics as the adversary.

The Formation of the New Right

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The New Right didn’t banish the Old Right with direct repudiation of the old leaders and ideas but rather gradually took over in an internal revolution. Murray Rothbard, who was deeply involved with this history, described the process saying, “The New Right did not bother, would not rouse possible resistance, by directing a frontal assault on the old idols: on the dead Senator Taft, on the Bricker Amendment, or on the old ideals of individualism and liberty. Instead, they ignored some, dropped others, and claimed to come to fulfill the general ideals of individualism in a new and superior “fusion” of liberty and ordered tradition” (1 p. 147).  The most significant leader and voice of the New right was William Buckley and the publication that documented the movement was the National Review.

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The process was facilitated by a common bitter enemy, Marxism that had risen to respectability nationally during the days of the New Deal and WWII and labeled all opponents of US involvement in the war as “agents of Hitler” in an attempt to silence opposition.  This was a sin that could not be forgiven or overlooked making “red-baiting” very natural for all on the Right regardless of being isolationist or interventionist.  Further the anti-Marxist consensus position united both liberals and conservatives of the time period around the “vital center”.  The logical question this raises is whether being anti-communist really required acceptance of the cold War policies of the Dulles’ and whether accepting these policies really made someone anti-communist? Maybe the Cold War, as opposed to being a repudiation of the close alignment with the Soviets associated with Tehran and Yalta, was a natural extension of it (1 pp. 146-8).  If the Cold War, as the Old Right argued, was just changing one form of Leviathan government for another, the real difference between the Russians and the American liberal center may eventually come down to little more than which form of ruling aristocracy held power.

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The New Right had three main philosophical components.  The first was the mobilization of the government and military for a worldwide crusade against communism. The second was the preservation and support of Christianity against the forces of atheism which were assumed by most to align fairly closely with communism as opposed to liberalism. The third and, in practice, the least important and most flexible was a market based laissez-faire domestic economic policies. While the Old Right was principally Orthodox Protestant and generally concentrated in the Midwest with a Southern contingent, the makeup of the New Right was significantly different. The New Right included a large contingent of ex-communist journalists and intellectuals along with and the new group of generally younger Catholics.

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 The main objective of this seemingly unlikely coalition was the absolute eradication of communism both at home and especially abroad. The Catholic group had two wings. One was a group of older European-oriented monarchists (Austrian Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn,  Roy Campbell, the pro-Spanish Carlist Frederick Wilhelmsen Sir Arnold Lunn) (1 pp. 159-60) that wasn’t particularly influential. While few would mount an academic case of monarchy, in light of the calamity of the 20th century, a reasonable case could be made that they functioned better than what they were replaced by.   The other larger group of American anti-Communists at the National Review included various members of the Buckley family (which was a sort of right-wing version of the Kennedy’s). A couple writers who became prominent at the National Review were Catholic converts (Frank Meyer and political scientist Willmoore Kendall).  This new demographic extended beyond intellectual circles and was representative of the broader population. Although not necessarily by intent, McCarthy had transformed the Right by attracting masses of urban Catholics and former leftists. They did not, however, always have a strong ideological small government or libertarian basis for their beliefs and may have been more united in terms of what they opposed. (1 pp. 158-60)

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Bill Buckley became prominent with his God and Man essay at Yale in 1951 referring to himself as a libertarian. His mentor was Frank Chodorov who was a key figure in the Old Right but that shifted to ex-communist journalist Whittaker Chambers. In another essay, A Young Republicans View in 1952, he said “thus far invincible aggressiveness of the Soviet Union” threatens America to the point where “we have to accept Big Government for the duration—for neither an offensive nor a defensive war can be waged … except through the instrument of a totalitarian bureaucracy within our shore” (12).  The logic in this really goes something like, to defeat the enemy, we must become like the enemy. The Dulles’ and the National Review became the statist opposite of the Communists.

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Another prominent figure in the New Right who eventually played a critical role in removing libertarian ideals of economic and personal liberty from the New Right and the Republican Party was Russell Kirk who wrote The Conservative Mind in 1953.  Kirk was far more acceptable to the Vital Center and corporatist Republicans than any remaining figures of the Old Right.  He was accepting of big government and domestic statism so long as they were supportive of a Christian framework.  Kirk popularized the words “Conservatism” and “New Conservatism” that never had general acceptance by the Old Right.  To the youth in the conservative movement during this time period who may have had little knowledge of the Old Right the perception of the real conflict frequently had little to do with liberty and a great deal to do with the defense of Christian culture against atheism (1 pp. 164-5).  At this point the argument has gone full circle back to the Progressive Christian belief that the government can or should be used to define and impose specific cultural characteristics.

As the new right became dominant it represented a combining of political thought that wouldn’t initially appear to easily align. Small government domestic policy would be paired with permanent military mobilization and activist foreign policy. This conflict isn’t generally well understood but has been a divide amongst those identifying themselves as “conservative” ever sense with a majority accepting this unlikely alignment and a minority rejecting it while lacking any sort of political power or platform. 

 

This is depicted in the following graphic:

Goldwater’s Defeat and development of the Uniparty

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By the late 50’s Barry Goldwater of Arizona emerged as the political leader of the New Right. There was a Draft Goldwater movement at the 1960 Republican convention intended to get Goldwater a place on the ticket with establishment candidate Richard Nixon having sealed the nomination (13).  Barry Goldwater wrote The Conscience of a Conservative in 1960 which was a libertarian thesis for the first nine chapters followed by the tenth chapter on “The Soviet Menace” (14). He had initially been an eager author but received a good deal of assistance from the National Review’s Brent Bozell (Buckley’s brother-in-law), who also wrote many of his speeches (14 p. fwd). Goldwater was nominated in 64 beating out establishment Republican Nelson Rockefeller, as the New Right conservatives took control of the party apparatus for a period of time and the establishment or Northeastern Republicans withdrew support. Goldwater was a reluctant candidate in many respects. Goldwater, who had a good relationship with the assassinated President Kennedy had thought of challenging Kennedy in 64 and even suggested that they could share a plane and travel around the country debating each other. After Kennedy was killed, Goldwater concluded that a Republican didn’t have a viable chance in the 64 election saying “the country was not going to assassinate two presidents in twelve months” (14 p. fwd).   Many of the Old Right enthusiastically supported the Goldwater candidacy having either adopted the Cold War foreign policies or were at least willing to give up foreign policy in the name of compromise and expediency.

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Goldwater lost the popular vote in the general election 61.1% to 38.5% and the Electoral College 486 to 52 in a complete landslide to an opponent, Lyndon Johnson, who chose not to even run for a second term in ’68 due principally to the Vietnam War. This electoral drubbing resulted in a strong liberal/progressive majority for the next two years leading to Great Society social legislation and another step function expansion of the federal government (13). The Republicans had their own landslide in the ’66 midterms but even after regaining the presidency in ‘68 they didn’t undo anything done during this two year time period. The next and arguably the last candidate of the New Right, prior to the neoconservaives, would be Ronald Reagan in 1980. If there really was intent to limit the size and cost of the government, it could only be concluded that the New Right was an abysmal failure in this regard.

In analyzing the demise of the Old Right and the rise of the New Right simple demographics have to be considered along with ideas and presentation. The base of the Old Right was orthodox Protestants (non-progressives), both evangelical and liturgical, and this was, in terms of percentages, a relatively small demographic concentrated in parts of the Midwest, West, and South. It had no real populace leader or appeal and also had an academic or “bookish” orientation that didn’t convey well to broader audiences. The New Right generated a broader demographic appeal bringing in Catholics and leveraged off of a populace figure who wasn’t directly associated with them.

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In the years and decades to come, the establishment Republican and Democratic national candidates would offer little to choose between in foreign policy which essentially became the same, and monetary policy had long since been turned over to “experts” who were decided on by an ever growing federal bureaucracy that acted as a sort of permanent government.  There were slight differences in domestic fiscal policy but only in degree.  No program that was created was ever discontinued. We effectively had a uniparty system where Right leaning voters had to decide between the “lesser of two evils” and spend their energies scheming how to take over the Republican Party once again.

This is a full clip of Goldwater's acceptances speech at the Republican Convention at the Cow Palace in San Francisco in 1964.  The reaction of the crowd at many points is interesting.

This Anti-Goldwater add addresses his perceived extreme foreign policy positions and potential nuclear conflict.  He consistently denied having aggressive foreign policy positions but these sorts of adds were very effective. The quote from his acceptance speech, “Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice. Moderation in pursuit of justice is no virtue” haunted his campaign

And here is a much shorter add that is more directly to the point

The Creation of the Religious Right

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A major element in the development of the conservative voter base was the “religious right” that ironically came into being during Jimmy Carter’s election in 1976. Following William Jennings Bryan’s hollow victory in the Scopes show trial in 1925 and the final take over by the theological liberals of the Northern Baptist Association and Northern Presbyterian Church in 1926 (orchestrated by John D Rockefeller), conservative protestant Christians Became nearly invisible both politically (15) and socially. As a voting bloc they were indistinguishable from the populations from which they came.  There were few if any uniting political or social beliefs that defined the flock which was in a way reflected in the strange characterization of Bryan himself who was a religious fundamentalists, social conservative, and a political progressive or even radical. Bryan died just a few days after the end of the Scopes trial and the spectacle of the trial was used to socially marginalize conservative Protestants for decades. Many poor believers readily accepted the New Deal despite the close association with Marxism or Collectivism while still not subscribing to the post-millennialism hopes of the progressive church.

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While conservative Christianity was increasingly marginalized and ridiculed by the academic and political elite, conservative protestant Christians seemed almost not to notice this at all or, their beliefs prevented any sort of response to it. While conservative Protestant Christianity hadn’t become entirely synonymous with Christian Fundamentalism there is little doubt that Fundamentalism along with its principal component of Dispensationalism were dominant especially amongst the independent churches and church groups. There were and are conservative or orthodox Protestant groups that are not necessarily dispensationalist, although they may not specifically prohibit it either, and don’t accept other extra-biblical aspects of fundamentalism.  These would include the Missouri Synod Lutherans, the Church of Christ, and other groups that are generally conservative Dutch Reformed or Calvinist. These were representative of the Old Right and differ in some conspicuous ways from the other conservative Protestant groups but they were and remain a clear minority.

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Fundamentalism is a relatively new belief system that developed in the 1800’s coming to America from Europe that fused dispensationalist end time prophecy with a defense of Biblical inerrancy and some extra-Biblical moral standards.  It started in the North amongst Northern Evangelicals opposed to progressive secularization and rejecting the idea that man could bring about the kingdom of God but, in many other ways, remained similar to their progressive counterparts. Specifically this means that fundamentalism was not tied to any sort of “small government” underlying philosophy. The fundamentalist belief system spread to the South and the West starting around 1890 but still had cultural headwinds to overcome which is one factor that makes it somewhat difficult to assess to what extent the takeover was complete. Fundamentalists being devoted Evangelicals could be assumed to have been fairly successful at passing their beliefs on to their children but from here we start to encounter logical contradictions that author Rousas Rushdoony referred to as “Intellectual Schizophrenia”. Fundamentalists have few accredited colleges or universities and fewer still have a curriculum that is distinguishable from state run or private secular schools. Church of Christ and Missouri Synod Lutherans are exceptions but, as noted, these groups are not dispensationalists (15). While some fundamentalists home schooled, the vast majority simply delegate the education of their children to public K-12 school systems using a curriculum that is openly hostile to their belief system and Christianity on a broader scale. To the extent that protestant churches have run their own schools, apart from Lutherans, they have typically just used the public school materials although this may be starting to change. 

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Fundamentalists had largely avoided politics or positions of authority in society believing that it is rapidly declining and not worthy of tying to save but are extremely compliant to all earthly authority, generally citing Romans 13 and related scripture. The scripture is interpreted as giving virtually unconstrained authority to those occupying positions of human authority even in a constitutional Republic where authority is legally constrained. While individuals within the body of believers are held to stringent moral standards those standards are not extended to political or corporate entities. While opposing violence and murder, they have tended to be enthusiastic supporters and participants in endless foreign wars. Lastly, while Fundamentalism had existed long enough to have some of its own cultural characteristics, they would be a hybrid of puritan Yankee culture from which it came and Cavalier and Borderlander Culture amongst those who predominantly practice it.

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Out of this confusion, David Rockefeller, as part of the campaign of Born Again Southern Baptist Jimmy Carter, around 1973 saw the opportunity to cobble together a voting bloc that would support his candidate and this ultimately proved to be successful at least for one election cycle (15). Carter lost the conservative Christian voters who generally felt betrayed by the Democratic policies or learned to reject the Democratic policies as they became fully familiar with them.  Neither the Reagan nor Carter campaigns wanted their candidates to actively seek this voting bloc in 1980 but Reagan did and this was a factor in his landslide victory. Throughout the Regan presidency, there were a significant number of conservative churches that became at least somewhat political although this was generally tied to single issues that they felt could be connected to clear scriptural standards as opposed to broader underlying concepts.  Christian political engagement rarely amounted to broad rejection of statism and sometimes might look more like legislating private moral decisions as had been a common theme in progressive Christianity (16).

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During this time dispensational prophecy became more specific and started to look a lot like reality.  Israel’s victory in the Seven Day War was seen by many as miraculous although when looked at from purely military terms is readily explainable. Russia was frequently portrayed as Gog and MaGog of Ezekiel and Revelation although that interpretation had been around since the Crimean war and was recycled and reinterpreted.  The world seemed in many respects to be poised for an abrupt climax. All of this aligned well with the neo-Conservative view of both Israel and Russia and unwavering support for the state of Israel was a key if not the key for maintaining fundamentalist political support. Prophecy fiction like the Late Great Planet Earth became a literature genre. Fundamentalist personalities were sometimes seen as being politically influential but this was probably overstated as the broader flock acted fairly independently. While there was a significant core within conservative Protestantism that made up the critical mass of most churches, the ties to the less connected members were often limited to general articles of faith and perhaps didn’t extend to complex theological topics related to prophetic dispensationalism. The ties of women to churches were also deeper than men. As the ultimate fate of the Soviet Union became clearer there was also a smaller more intellectual subgroup within the church who stated to wonder if the real threat to faith and the specter of one world government might not be better associated with the western globalists who had been ready to appear to be the allies of faith so long as it was politically useful.

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Below is a link to a speech from Ronald Reagan from 1984 in Dallas at a Prayer Breakfast highlighting his thoughts on faith and politics and his relation with the Christian voter base.

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The Neoconservative Trojan Horse

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The final step in the development of conservatism as it was to exist following the Cold War was the ascendency of the neoconservatives. Neo-conservatism originated as an academic movement amongst anti-Stalinist/ anti-Russian left wing academics in the late 50’s and 60’s that gradually took over American conservatism by the 1980’s.  The final conquest happened during the Reagan administration and remained unchallenged until the time of Trump apart from Ron Paul and a few others. In some respects the neo-conservatives can be hard to distinguish from the New Right but their background stands out more so than their policies. Neo-conservatives were highly educated and established institutional academics that had an existing platform, following, and broad personal and media influence. While neo-conservatives have come to be largely associated with Global American military dominance, they initially became known for their critique of failing government bureaucratic experiments.  Many of the founders of neo-conservatism were ethnically Jewish, although not in an Orthodox or traditional sense, while some of their most vocal and articulate adversaries were also Jewish like Murray Rothbard and Paul Gottfried. (17) This created a philosophical split amongst conservatism that remains very present today although not clearly understood by the average voter.

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Simply referring to neo-conservatives as awakened academic progressives doesn’t go far enough in describing their background.  They were generally “reformed” Trotskyites, which is distinctly different from a Stalinist, who also incorporated political Zionism. When Stalin won control of the Soviet Union from Trotsky after the death of Lenin the purges that followed weren’t acts of random paranoia but specifically targeted the followers of Trotsky (18). The Trotskyites were disproportionately Jewish and frequently had ties to foreign actors, especially England. The English played prominent roles in both the first and second Russian Revolution as well as the difficult to explain collapse of the White Army in the Russian Civil War that followed (18). Trotsky himself was accused and convicted of being a British spy and assassinated in Mexico in 1940.  For someone coming from this background, trying to dismantle the Soviet Union would seem fairly natural and this aligns with a subgrouping within neo-conservatism referred to as Atlantacists whose objective has always been to do just that producing manageable “statelets” out of the former super power. The common understanding of the philosophical split between Trotsky and Stalin is that Trotsky intended to pursue world revolution while Stalin accepted communism for a single country (18). This would have to be recast to portray Russia as an expanding global menace in order to justify the cold war and a state of permanent mobilization.  Whether and to what extent this recasting was justified or not was the major point of contention between the New Right of the 60’s and the Old Right and continues to divide the establishment or neo-conservative branch of the Republican Party with the more libertarian populist wing. 

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The original contingent of neo-conservative writers were fairly well known consisting of Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell, James Q. Wilson, and Seymour Martin Lipset whose essays appeared regularly in The Public Interest (17). Of these, Kristol was probably the most significant.  He had described a neoconservative as “a liberal who was mugged by reality”. A more libertarian leaning critic would add to this saying something like “but decided not to press charges” or “allowed the perpetrator to seek counseling” (17).  Behind the scenes was Leo Strauss, professor of political philosophy at the University of Chicago who was known in conservative academic circles in the later 50’s and 60’s and who Kristol cited as being an especially big influence on his thinking (19). Strauss’s students went on to make up major portions of the Reagan and Bush administrations. One of Strauss’s students, Harry Jaffa, was a contributor to Strauss’s major work, History of Political Philosophy. He worked in Goldwater’s campaign in 64 and has been credited with the infamous phrase, “Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice.” (17)

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These outcast liberals found a home at the National Review but they were distinctly different from the New Right founders who gradually displaced the Old Right there. The original founders of National Review didn’t come from tenured university positions with guaranteed income. They had no legitimacy other than what they could create for themselves. The neo-conservatives were in no way a grassroots movement and consisted of institutionalized subsidized professors and writers.  The founding neoconservatives spent their formative years as liberal or progressive Democrats and, in many cases, were Trotskyites, who had obtained tenured faculty positions at the nation’s most prominent universities (17).  They were never outsiders and, when the Reagan administration came into power, they moved their center of operations from New York to the Washington Beltway (19).

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Referring to key neo-conservatives figures as Trotskyites may seem like opinionated name calling but many were fairly open about their philosophical roots and their ultimate loyalties. In “The Neo-Conservative Persuasion: Selected Essays 1942-2009” one of the essays, “Reflections of a Trotskyist” Kristol writes openly of his roots in the Trotsky version of communism (20). In 2007 in the National Review Online Stephen Schwarz explained, “To my last breath, I will defend Trotsky who alone and pursued from country to country and finally laid low in his own blood in a hideously hot house in Mexico City, said no to Soviet coddling to Hitlerism, to the Moscow purges, and to the betrayal of the Spanish Republic, and who had the capacity to admit that he had been wrong about the imposition of a single-party state as well as about the fate of the Jewish people. To my last breath, and without apology. Let the neofascists and Stalinists in their second childhood make of it what they will.” (20)

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The neo-conservatives were readily let into the ever-widening conservative tent by the establishment and New Right Republicans based on their assaults on liberal policies along with their institutional prominence following the old adage that “the enemy of your enemy is your friend”.   What wasn’t recognized or acknowledged, however, was that the neo-conservatives never saw the failure of the government as being systemic and never saw a need for a rollback of size or the scope of the state and this was apparent in some of their more prominent writings. Patrick Monahan’s report on the condition of the Black family in America titled The Negro Family: the Case of National Action is a good example of this. While this made many points that the liberal establishment did not accept and ultimately led to Monahan’s departure from liberal politics to the neo-conservative movement, he sees no real limitation to the power or roll of government and here sees the need for government to change culture for the national good (21 pp. 67-73). Those who were left unrepresented were the remnants of the Old Right, the Libertarians, the paleoconservatives (traditional conservatives) and the South in a broader sense; these were now people without representation, or a country, or a voice.

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The impact of the neoconservatives goes well beyond their direct influence on politics as the world view they represent has been culturally ingrained as defining conservatism and has been broadly accepted and propagated by establishment and New Right Republicans. This required a fundamentally new understanding of history and American nationalism. The traditional conservative view of history is that it is comprised of collective memories that retain old virtues and honor heritage with loyalties growing from experience (22). In its place rose a messianic view of history defined philosophically in terms of universal and abstract concepts driving Utopian dreams much in line with the “City on a Hill” theme applied to the American Nation.  While Leo Strauss was principally an academic as opposed to political figure, and his death in 1973 was prior to full assent of the neoconservatives to power under Reagan and the two Bush administrations, he is generally seen as having created this sort of new Puritan vision and propagating it through his students or followers like Harry Jaffa of Claremont, and George Will making him the spiritual father of the American Empire.

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Strauss had both students and followers with the followers breaking down into two schools, east and west coast.  The east coast Straussians were more philosophical and less political with Joseph Cropsey of Chicago and Harvey Mansfield of Harvard being two leading figures.  The west coast Straussians, whose prominent adherents include Jaffa, Larry Arnn (Hillsdale), Thomas G West, Peter Schramm (Ashland), and Charles Kesleer (also of Claremont) are highly political.  Thomas G West described his belief system as being “combative as hell .. They not only dislike liberals, leftist, Democrats, they have fights to pick with the followers of other conservative figures: Fredrick Hayek, Ayn Rand, and Wilmore Kendall” (23 pp. 7-10). To the Straussian the memory of the old anti-imperialist Right represented by Taft and Bickley, modern libertarians, and, when politically expedient, the South are as much of an enemy as neo-Marxists on the left.  Steven Smith of Yale described the ideology of the west coast Straussians as follows: “The West Coasters have created a synthesis of Strauss’s defense of the classical doctrine of natural right — the view that there is a single immutable standard of justice — with the wisdom of the American founding fathers, supplemented by Lincoln and Churchill (recently names like Calvin Coolidge and Clarence Thomas have been added to the list). Contra Strauss [emphasis added], the West Coasters have developed their own theory of American exceptionalism, arguing that the framers uniquely combined features of classical prudence with biblical morality” (24).

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While Strauss’s work is associated principally with the University of Chicago, he also transferred European thought to America in the form of phenomenology which is the philosophical study of the structures of experience and consciousness and was founded in the early 20th century by Edward Husserl.  It was then expanded at the universities of Gottingen and Munich  (25) and eventually spread to France and the US.  Although Jewish by background his religious views were ambiguous. Strauss held that neither the ancient world nor Christendom envisioned any strict limits on the power of the state leading to the elevation of the state and the statesman (22).  This was most prominently shown in their near cult-like admiration for President Lincoln and his willingness to readily act outside of the limits of his constitutional authority.  The failed war of Southern Independence along with all the subsequent American conquests would be recast as crusades to spread democracy and “freedom” based on the proposition that “all men are created equal”.  Even more extreme than the recreation of Lincoln, the progressive social activists of the 19th and early 20th century, who grew out of the progressive northern evangelical churches, would be redefined in a sort of conservative context advancing the “proposition nation”. This version of history would require the vilification of not only the South but anyone holding an anti-federalist position and the elevation of Yankee puritan ethno-religious culture that produced Progressivism as the true American cultural heritage.

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The debate between conservative Southern historian M.E. Bradford and Harry Jaffa dramatically contrasted these two incompatible perspectives as summarized by Thomas Woods: “ Bradford argued that Lincolnian rhetoric, particularly the Great Emancipator’s teleological language (e.g, his description of the United States as a nation “dedicated to a proposition”) was a recipe for ongoing revolution that a genuine conservative could not embrace.  The idea of the federal government as an engine of equality enforcement rather than as the modest, purely nomocratic agent of a confederation of sovereign states, endowed with strictly limited powers, amounted to Bradford’s judgment to a revolutionary overthrow of the original constitutional order” (22). The Straussian historical interpretation was easy for the New Right cold warriors to adopt because it aligned well with their core positions and also became a dominant position in public schools before being largely displaced by critical theory interdisciplinary materialism.

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The reduction of the study of history to little more than the history of philosophy is certainly one of the most damaging products of neo-conservatism in part because it aligns so closely with other changes in modern society. To the modern student in western society the idea that life is principally navigating theoretical philosophical questions is largely believable because that is what their lives have consisted of.  They are ignorant of the history of technology apart from their user interface on modern electronic devices and have not had to deal with either want or labor which defined so much of human history.  Taking a principally philosophical view of history is really one of the most egregious applications of “presentism” in that it causes the lives of those who came before us to be redefined in modern political terms and much of the reality in which they lived, to simply be deleted. It also created a path for a hyper-nationalistic neo-conservative historical narrative to be replaced with Frankfort School Critical Theory which defines the current culture war.

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Neo-Conservatism and Neo-Liberalism

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So between the end of World War II and the 1990’s American conservatism was dramatically redefined to look nothing like traditional conservatism through successive waves of reborn liberals who adopted and then took over conservatism.  Meanwhile, the New Left was continually drifting further towards neo-Marxism. So what can be said of the real identity of the neo-conservatives?  Pat Buchanan provided this short and pointed summary:

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The neoconservatives are not really conservatives at all. They are impostors and opportunists. They were Leftists in the 1930s, New Deal and Great Society Democrats through the 1960s, and slid to the right and the Republicans after Nixon and Reagan began rolling up forty-nine state landslides. They defected from liberalism only when they saw conservatism in the ascendancy, and they rode the Reagan revolution into power. Their heroes—Wilson, FDR, Dr. King—are men of the Left. Their tracts denouncing rivals and critics as traitors, fascists, and anti-Semites come straight out of the hard Left. Their agenda—endless struggle and war if necessary to impose secular democracy and social revolution on the Islamic world—is neo-Jacobin, out of the French, not the American Revolution – Pat Buchanan (26 p. 250)

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Professor Alexander Dugin expanded on these themes in 2024 by saying, “American neoconservative circles are in solidarity with the globalist agenda of those behind Biden.  These are former Trotskyists who hate Russia and believe that a world revolution is possible only after the complete victory of capitalism, that is, the global West on a worldwide scale.  Therefore, they have postponed this goal until the cycle of capitalist globalization is completed, hopping to return to the topic of proletarian revolution later, after the global victory of the liberal west.” (27)

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With specific regard to the relationship of neo-conservatism with Christianity, Buchanan goes on to cite James Kurth from “Western Tradition: Our Tradition”: “From their origins (be it as followers of Leon Trotsky or Leo Strauss), neoconservatives have seen the Christian tradition as an alien, even a threatening one…. The only Western tradition the neoconservatives actually want to defend is the Enlightenment…. [T]hey have wanted to advance it in the rest of the world with the establishment of a kind of American empire…. [This] is not a conservative project but a radical and revolutionary one. For the most part, it might be said that, with friends like the neoconservatives, Western civilization does not need enemies… [neoconservatives] may think that they will create a global and universal civilization, abroad and at home, but the evidence is accumulating that they instead opened the doors to the barbarians both without (e.g., Islamic terrorists) and within (pagan disregard for the dignity of human life).”  He concluded that the best defense against barbarians at home and abroad isn’t empire but defense of the Christian traditions that built Western Civilization. (26 p. 251)

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While Critical Theory was a clear threat to western culture and history, it was an obvious one that succeeded to the extent it has largely because traditional conservatives didn’t take their message at face value and chose rather to respond to their neo-Marxist critics almost as if to try to win their approval. Neo-conservatism took over the right from the inside out and redefined it.  Apart from Libertarian and Southern contingents that accurately recognized what was happening, most traditional conservatives were effectively disenfranchised and only gradually became vaguely aware of what had happened thirty to forty years after the tipping point had been passed. To the real conservative, the Republican Party from the time of the demise of the Old Right has really offered nothing other than being slightly “less bad” than the Democratic Party and perhaps offering some protection from the policies of the increasingly radicalized Left.

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Below is a link to a short video from Ron Paul done in 2011 giving a overview of Neoconservatism and Neoconservatives:

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Bibliography

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1. Rothbard, Murray N. The Betrayal of the American Right. Auburn, Alabama : Ludwig Von Misses Institute, 2007.

2. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, First Session. Buffett, Howard. Washington, DC : s.n., 1947. p. 2217.

3. Kennedy, Joseph P. Present Policy is Politically and Morally Bankrupt. Vital Speeches. January 1, 1951.

4. Hoover, Herbert. Our national Policies in Crisis. Vital Speeches 17, no 6. January 1, 1951.

5. The Past Marches On. Morgenstern, George. 1953, Human Events.

6. Garrett, Garet. The People's Pottage. Caldwell Idaho : Caxton Printers, 1953.

7. Manly, Chesly. The Twenty-Year Revolution: From Roosevelt to Eisenhower. Chicago, Illinois : Henry Regency Company, 1954.

8. Singer, C. Gregg. A Theological Interpretation of American History. Vestavia Hills, Alabama : Solid Ground Christian Books, 1964.

9. Lindley, Earnest K. Message to Congress. Newsweek. February 8, 1954, p. 32.

10. Quigley, Carroll. Tragedy and Hope A history of the World in Our Time. New York, New York : Macmillan company, 1966.

11. Roberts, Craig. LewRockwell.com. [Online] August 13, 2016. https://www.lewrockwell.com/2016/08/paul-craig-roberts/rethinking-cold-war/.

12. Buckley, William F. A Young Republican's View. Commonwealth . January 25, 1952, pp. 391-3.

13. Franke, David. LewRockwell.com. [Online] November 4, 2014. https://www.lewrockwell.com/2014/11/david-franke/bittersweet-memories-of-an-election-50-years-ago/.

14. Goldwater, Barry. The Conscience of a Conservative. New York : Victor Publishing Company, 1960.

15. North, Gary. LewRockwell.com. [Online] October 12, 2007. https://www.lewrockwell.com/2007/10/gary-north/the-silence-of-the-fundamentalist-lambs/.

16. Ryan, Daniel M. Lew Rockwell.com. [Online] October 24, 2006. https://www.lewrockwell.com/2006/10/daniel-m-ryan/six-troubles-with-the-religious-right/.

17. North, Gary. LewRockwell.com. [Online] June 10, 2003. https://www.lewrockwell.com/2003/06/gary-north/an-introduction-to-neoconservatism/.

18. Poe, Richard. How the British Invented Communism. [Online] Jan 10, 2023. https://richardpoe.substack.com/p/how-the-british-invented-communism?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2#footnote-3-95903021.

19. Verhaegh, Marcus. LewRockwell.com. [Online] February 3, 2004. https://www.lewrockwell.com/2004/02/marcus-verhaegh/george-will-and-the-neoconservatives/.

20. Cathey, Boyd. Abeville Institute. [Online] May 17, 2024. https://www.abbevilleinstitute.org/the-neoconservative-disorder/.

21. Ehrman, John. The rise of Neoconservativism. New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, 1995.

22. Woods, Thomas E. LewRockwell.com. [Online] September 28, 2004. https://www.lewrockwell.com/2004/09/thomas-woods/the-neocon-godfather/.

23. Norton, Ann. Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire. New Haven, Conn : Yale University Press, 2004.

24. Masugi, Ken. Law & Liberty. [Online] August 25, 2013. https://lawliberty.org/straussian-civil-wars/.

25. Zahavi, Dan. Husserl's Phenomenology. California : Stanford University Press, 2003.

26. Buchanan, Patrick J. Where the Right Went Wrong. New York. New York : St. Martin's Publishing, 2004.

27. Dugin, Alexander. Arktos. [Online] June 21, 2024. https://www.arktosjournal.com/p/the-fate-of-the-world-will-be-decided.

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