How the War Started

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The immediate event that initiated the war was, of course, the Confederate shelling of Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor on April 12 of 1861 in response to the Lincoln’s administration decision to resupply the island from military vessels. Prior to that, the contingent on the island simply bought food and supplies in town. The Island was a small federal outpost of no major strategic importance guarding the entrance to the harbor. Prior to this event there was no consensus in the North, including within in the Lincoln cabinet that the South wouldn’t simply be allowed to separate peacefully and the states of the Upper South (Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee), which had larger populations to support a war, were still part of the Union and in all probability would have remained so.  South Carolina had seceded three months prior to the political drama of Fort Sumner and also Fort Pickens and had taken no aggressive actions against those stationed on the island.  The seceding states had sent representatives to Washington to negotiate the sale of property and division of debt.  Note here that the ownership of these federal forts is somewhat arguable.  This was generally not a case like exists in modern era, especially in the western states, where the federal government actually owned the land. They were probably best characterized at tenants. If this is assumed to be the case, the rules for engagement become quite different and fall under international law. Instead of the first to use force being considered responsible for a conflict the “first who renders force necessary to defend and protect a right, is the aggressor”. (1 p. 9)

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Two of Lincoln’s opponents in the presidential election were also key figures in determining what would be done with regard to Forts Sumter and Pickens.  William Seward who would be Secretary of State in the Lincoln administration lost the party nomination to Lincoln in what could be considered an upset.  Prior to that he was Governor of New York and then US Senator and could fairly be considered an opponent of slavery or at least the expansion of slavery. He was to later survive an assignation attempt that was related to Lincoln’s assignation. Seward, like Lincoln, was a former Whig and was also associated with an anti-Mason movement. Stephen Douglas was Senator from Illinois and came in second to Lincoln in popular vote in the 1860 general election.  If the Democrat Party hadn’t run three candidates in the general election dividing the vote, he almost certainly would have been president as Lincoln won with only about 40% of the popular vote and the electoral vote was entirely regional.

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From December thru January about 2/3 of northern newspapers supported states rights to secede and it appears that at least that level of support also existed within the general population.  Starting in February, however, the editorial tone started to change when the potentially economic impact stated to be seen more clearly:

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“No, we must NOT let the South go….. what about our shipping and what about our revenue? We were divided and confused until our pockets were touched.” NY Times March 30, 1861 (2)

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“That either the revenue from duties must be collected in the ports of the rebel states or the port must be closed to importations from abroad is generally admitted. If NEITHER of these things be done, our revenue laws are substantially repealed; THE SOURCES WHICH SUPPLY OUR TREASURY WILL BE DRIED UP; there shall be no money to carry on the government; the nation will become bankrupt before the next crop of corn is ripe.  There will be nothing to furnish means of subsistence to the army; nothing to keep our Navy afloat; nothing to pay the salaries of the public officers; the present order of things must come to a dead stop.” Chicago Daily Times March 2, 1861 (2)

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The Southern Confederacy will not employ our ships or buy our goods. What is our shipping without it? Literally nothing… it is very clear that the South gains by this process and we lose. No…we must not let the South go.” The Union Democrat (Manchester, New Hampshire) February 19, 1861 (2)

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The actions and developing strategy of the new administration reflected this evolving view of a potential war and the challenges in selling the idea to the public. These accounts that follow show how the situation developed on a day to day basis and are adapted from Southern Independence – Why War by Charles T Pace and an older book by a Confederate Veteran, H.W. Johnstone from 1917.  Johnstone’s book or paper was written largely off of “The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion” compiled and published by the US government which had recently become available in this time period. As this started to unfold it is important to note and keep in mind that within Lincoln’s cabinet General Winfield Scott and Senator Seward, who was now Secretary of State and who lost the nomination to Lincoln, wanted peace and did not support an invasion.  Scott had said of the South, “Let the wayward sisters go in peace”. (1 p. 16)

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January 1861: Capt. John Vodges was sent with an armed force aboard the USS Brooklyn to reinforce Fort Pickens. An armistice was reached on January 29th where the US government agreed not to reinforce either Sumter or Fort Pickens and the force remained in Pensacola Harbor.  This was prior to Lincoln taking office. (1 p. 11)

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11 March: Lincoln directed Scott to write an order to Major Anderson (Union commander of Fort Sumter) to evacuate the Fort but tells him not to send it until instructed to do so. It was also on 11 March that the Confederate Congress enacted a low tariff of 5% increasing the economic threat to the North. Anderson would receive no direction until April 9th when Federal warships arrive at Charleston Harbor (3 p. 150).  Around this same time the Confederate Government sent three commissioners to Washington to negotiate terms of separation. Lincoln wouldn’t receive them but they did communicate with Seward unofficially through a third party. Lincoln’s position and communication remained vague and noncommittal. (3 p. 150)

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An important influence on the Lincoln cabinet and the administration was the Blair family of Maryland and Missouri. Montgomery Blair was the postmaster and was the main “war hawk” within the cabinet. That patriarch was Francis P. Blair and his other son Frank was a congressman and would become a Union general. The son-in-law Gustavas Vasa Fox was the assistant secretary of the Navy. The Blair family, like Lincoln, were staunch advocates of black deportation to Africa. They were former Democrats who pursued wealth and power and were fluid in their beliefs.  They sought to become powerful through war. (3 p. 150)

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15 March: Lincoln asks each of his cabinet members to provide him with a written opinion on provision Charleston Harbor. Seward, Chase, Welles, Bates, and Cameron all opposed it. Montgomery Blair was the only cabinet member who argued for war. Those that knew war opposed it. (3 p. 152)

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15 March: Senator Douglas attacked the Blair’s in a speech in congress saying: “What they really want is a civil war. They are determined, first, on seeing slavery abolished by force, and then on expelling the entire Negro race from the continent. This was old Blair’s doctrine, Sir, long ago, and it is Montgomery’s doctrine, Sir. If they can get and keep their grip on Lincoln, this country will never see peace or prosperity again, Sir, in your time or mine, or in our children’s time. The president of the United States holds the destiny of this country in his hands. I believe he means peace, and war will be averted, unless he is over ruled by the disunion faction of his party. We all know the irrepressible conflict is going on in his camp, even debating whether Fort Sumter shall be surrendered when it is impossible to hold it; whether Major Anderson shall not be kept there until he starves to death, or applies the torch with his own hand to the match that blows him and his little garrison into eternity, for fear that somebody in the Republican party might say you had backed down” (3 p. 152). Douglas had said previously he would not let the “war wing” Republicans prevail. “I know their scheme. I do not mean to let them plunge this country into war.”

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19 March: Senator Thomas Clingman of North Carolina said Lincoln would not call Congress into session because, if he would ask them to go to war against the Confederate states, “I do not believe they would agree to do it.” He went on to predict: “The Republicans intend ... as soon as they can collect the force to have a war, to begin; and then call Congress suddenly together and say, ‘The honor of the country is concerned; the flag is insulted. You must come up and vote men and money.’” (3 p. 153) Meanwhile Blairs’ in-law, Gustavus Vasa Fox, suggested an expedition into Charleston Harbor that would ostensibly carry food but below decks there would be troops who would land on Sumter.  This would either discredit the Confederates by allowing an unopposed landing, or ideally would provoke some sort of military response which Lincoln could exploit to start war.

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21 March: South Carolina governor Pickens allows Fox to visit Major Anderson in what was a sort of fact finding mission for the administration. Following that, Lincoln’s friend, law partner, and body guard Ward Lamon is allowed by Pickens to visit Fort Sumter on the premise that he had come to arrange the removal of the garrison.  When Lamon asked if a warship would be allowed to enter the harbor to remove the troops Picken’s responded that only a merchant ship would be allowed which provided specific information on what the Confederate response would be. Lamon said he would return in a few days to evacuate the troops. (3 p. 154)

. “Scott, the real warrior, a man who had proved his bravery, wanted peace; Blair, the politician whose only credential was greed, demanded war.” (3 p. 154)

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29 March: In the cabinet meeting this day the resistance to war began to weaken under Republican Party pressure.  Seward and Scott stood firm with Seward saying, “The dispatch of an expedition to Fort Sumter would provoke attack and involve war. I would instruct Major Anderson to retire from Sumter, forthwith.”  (3 pp. 154-5)

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29 March: Lincoln ordered Fox to prepare a mission to Charleston Harbor using war ships. Lincoln wrote Secretary of War Cameron, “I desire that an expedition to move by sea, be got ready to sail as early as the 6th of April.” (3 p. 155)

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At this point it was generally clear that the Republican Party wanted and maybe even needed war to ensure its survival.  The northern financial interests who were the financial supporters of the party generally wanted war as it was strongly in their financial interests yet there remained many merchants and bankers in the eastern cities who wanted peace. (3 p. 155)

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30 March: Governor Pickens wires the three Confederate commissioners in Washington to ask why the garrison remained at Fort Sumter long after Lamon had assured him it would be evacuated and fifteen days after Seward had given his pledge that the fort would be quickly evacuated. (3 p. 55)

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31 March: Capt. Vogdes receives orders stating, “at first favorable opportunity, you will land your company, reinforce Fort Pickens, and hold the same till further orders..” This order was from the “Hd. Qtrs of the Army” (implying General Scott) and had been written on March 12th. This order was transmitted to Capt. Adams at Fort Pickens requesting boats and material support to implement the order. (1 pp. 11-12)

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1 April: Capt. Adams refuses to comply with the order stating, “It would be considered not only a declaration but an act of war; and would be resisted to the utmost.” (1 pp. 11-12)

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4 April: John B. Baldwin, a Virginia pro-Union leader, tells Lincoln that if he will withdraw troops from Sumter and Pickens Virginia would not secede. In keeping with his public statements, Lincoln assured Baldwin that he wanted peace. On the same day a group of Republican governors demanded that he initiate a war and said that they will give him money and men. He agreed with them also. Both statements were made in a vague manner. (3 p. 55)

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6 April: Lincoln wrote a brief statement to Gov. Pickens saying: “I am directed by the President of the United States to notify you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only, and that, if such an attempt be not resisted, no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition will be made without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort.” He then directed Robert S. Chew, a minor official in State Department, to go to Governor Pickens, read the statement, hand it to him, say nothing else, and leave. (3 p. 156)

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7 April: The same day Lincoln told Virginian John Minor Botts, who was a fellow Whig whom he knew in Congress in 1848, that he wanted peace and to assure the South he ordered Northern governors to mobilize their militia. (3 p. 156)

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8 April: Lincoln’s messenger, Robert Chew, traveled to Charleston, met Governor Pickens and General Beauregard, read the declaration, handed it to Pickens, and left as instructed.

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8 or 9 April: Major Anderson received a letter from the War Department. He had been told to evacuate the fort without a fight, but was now told that he was to hold the fort at all costs pending the arrival of an invading fleet.  Anderson wrote, “We shall strive to do our duty, though I frankly say that my heart is not in the war which I see is to be thus commenced. That God will still avert it, and cause us to resort to pacific measures to maintain our rights, is my ardent prayer.” (3 p. 156)

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9 April: The Union fleet arrived at Charleston. The city is shocked to see six warships off the bar.  On this same day Lincoln, his wife, and a party, rode out to Oak Hill Cemetery. There he told reporters, “The country will see whether they dare fire upon an unarmed vessel carrying relief to our starving soldiers.” An accompanying reporter wrote: “He expressed little hope for peace, intimated a determination to relieve Major Anderson and hold other Southern forts at all hazards.” (3 p. 157)

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April 10: Capt. Anderson at Ft Pickens receives a message by special courier stating: “The Department regrets that you did not comply with the request of Capt. Vogdes.  You will immediately on the first favorable opportunity after receipt of this order, afford every facility to Capt. Vodes to enable him to land the troops under his command…” (1 p. 22)

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10 April: Ex-Senator Wigfall sends a telegraph from Charleston to President Davis in Montgomery: “Lincoln intends war. Delay is to his advantage and our disadvantage. Let us take Fort Sumter before we have to fight the fleet and the fort.” (3 p. 157)

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11 April: Confederate commissioners waiting in Washington send their last dispatch: “… the main object of the expedition is the relief of Sumter … a force will be landed which will overcome all opposition.” (3 p. 157)

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11 April: The Brooklyn gets underway at 9:00PM and unloads the troops and marines that night violating the terms of the armistice. (1 p. 23)

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12 April:  The Confederate leadership, weighing the political vs. military risk, determined to fire on the fort. The attack was more symbolic than effective but, through amplification in the press, it produced enough general moral outrage to make it possible to initiate a war on a scale that was to that point never before seen. Upon hearing of the Confederate decision to fire, Lincoln triumphantly declared, I knew they would do it.” (3 p. 157)

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The preceding paragraphs are a fairly detailed account of the actions leading to the event that triggered the war largely in the participants own words. Absent from it are debates or arguments on slavery or any other moral or philosophical topic apart from most of the players in this seeing the destruction of war as a moral or spiritual constraint on their actions. Otherwise this was a case study in power politics. Although a topic for debate, it appears very unlikely that if any of the other leading candidates for president were elected in 1860 the Sumter incident would have occurred. The same could possibly be said of the Confederacy as well.  Jefferson Davis accepted the position out of duty.  His chief competitor who sought the position of President of the Confederacy was Charles Toombs of Georgia who as a former Senator and was now Secretary of State of the Confederacy. Toombs opposed firing on Sumter saying, “This puts us in the wrong. It would be suicide, murder, will lose us every friend in the North. It will inaugurate a civil war greater than any the world has yet seen.”  (3 p. 160)

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Bibliography

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1. Johnstone, H. W. Truth of the War conspiracy of 1861. Wake Forest, NC : The Scuppernong Press, 2012. 978-1-9428063-4-9.

2. Kennedy, Walter D. and Kennedy, James R. Forward - Truth of the War Conspiracy of 1861. [book auth.] H. W. Johnstone. Truth of the War Conspiracy of 1861. Wake Forest, NC : The Scuppernog Press, 2012.

3. Pace, Charles T. Southern Independence: Why War. s.l. : Shotwell Publishing, 2015.